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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional thinkers have long debated the impact of the written
word on constitutionalism.' More precisely, they have focused on
whether a constitution's "written-ness," its unique character as a
written document, effectuates what this article terms "empowered
constitutionalism."2  Empowered constitutionalism in liberal
democratic polities has four salient characteristics: constitutional
norms based upon a liberal agenda; constitutional supremacy over
legislation; a judiciary exclusively entitled to construe state action in
light of constitutional norms; and constitutional entrenchment against
formal modification of the constitution except by an expression of
democratic will.
3
1. See e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); HARVEY V. JAFFA, ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and Democratic Legitimacy:
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998);
Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
2. See Grey, supra note 1.
3. See FRANK 1. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 65 (1999)
(defining "liberal democracy" as a set of programmatic commitments to freedom,
individual rights, the rule of law, and limited government); see also Dr. Gidon
Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional
Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.. REV. 617 (1999) (proposing that
supremacy over legislation, entrenchment against formal modification except by
democratic process, and empowerment of the judiciary to exclusively construe
state action against constitutional. norms generally define a constitution); Karl
Lowenstein, Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age,
in CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR 11 204
(Arnold J. Zurcher ed., 1951) (defining "nominal" and "semantic"
constitutionalism); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 19 (2000); ANDREA BONIME-BLANC,
SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
(1987) (discussing authoritarian abuse of the constitutional form). This article
adopts and modifies Sapir's descriptive qualities to define empowered
constitutionalism, adding a fourth requirement that the constitution adhere to a
liberal agenda. See Sapir, supra, at 645. This agenda should uphold both structural
EMPOWERING CONSTITUTIONALISM
In the United States, written-ness stands as a basic issue in the
struggle over constitutional meaning.4 Some argue persuasively that
on both normative and descriptive grounds, empowered
constitutionalism in America does not depend on the Constitution's
written-ness.5 These thinkers believe that written-ness is secondary to
the evolving meaning of the Constitution.6 They have concluded that
constitutional development in the United States has and should have
aspects of democratic governance and the civil rights necessary to maintain that
structure's substantive democratic spirit. This article adds the additional
requirement to Sapir's descriptive qualities because the present discussion is
specifically concerned with the role of constitutionalism in liberal democracies.
The additional descriptor ensures that not only is a particular constitutional system
"empowered," in the sense that the constitutional system holds specific powers vis-
A-vis the state, but also that the system employs those powers in the service of
democratic principles. To illustrate empowered constitutionalism by way of
contrast with other forms of constitutionalism, empowered constitutionalism
squarely contradicts what political scientist Karl Lowenstein has typified as
"nominal" constitutionalism and "semantic" constitutionalism. See Lowenstein,
supra, at 204. Nominal constitutionalism arises where political authorities declare
a constitution, but neither follow nor enforce the principles articulated by that
constitution. Consequently, that constitution has no significant effect on the life of
a state's citizenry. See id. One example of this is Yugoslavia's 1963 constitution,
which promulgated a limited system of judicial review through a Federal
Constitutional Court and six republican constitutional courts. See SCHWARTZ,
supra, at 19. The Yugoslav constitution gave the Federal Constitutional Court the
power to review the constitutionality of federal legislation. See Lowenstein, supra,
at 204. However, in practice, the Yugoslav government structured the Federal
Constitutional Court so that the Communist Party and the Federal Parliament could
overrule the Federal Constitutional Court through ordinary legislative means. See
id. Similarly, semantic constitutionalism exists where a constitution carries
absolutely no independent force and serves only to promote the selfish interests of
a ruling state power elite. See id. Examples of authoritarian use of a semantic
constitution include 'Generalissimo Francisco Franco's Fundamental Laws and
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos' Decrees. See BONIME-BLANC, supra, at 9-
12.
4. See Grey, supra note 1, at 703-04 (discussing Justice Black's criticism of
constitutional textualism in judicial review).
5. See id. at 705 (arguing that courts apply values not articulated in the
Constitution to determine the constitutionality of a statute).
6. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996) (arguing that the text of the Constitution does not have
a prominent role in constitutional understanding versus reliance on caselaw).
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little to do, if anything, with text, and much more to do with socially
and politically entrenched liberal values.7
However, this logic is flawed. First, it often unquestioningly
assumes that empowered constitutionalism primarily serves to
support democratic principles through judicial review, without
closely examining the connections between governance and
constitutionalism. It is premature to announce the preeminence of
judicial review over textual imperative in maintaining American
constitutionalism, without accounting for the ultimate function of
empowered constitutionalism in a democratic society.
Second, this logic is geopolitically parochial.8 It typically focuses
on the American constitutional experience without seeking the
benefit of comparative constitutional analysis.9 Examining emergent
democratic regimes with constitutional aspirations offers fresh data
with which to evaluate commonplace notions regarding the relation
between empowered constitutionalism and written-ness.'l
This article seeks to fill these gaps in constitutional thought by
examining Israeli constitutional development."1 Examining the
evolution of Israeli constitutionalism demonstrates that judges'
formal commitment to text as a source of normative authority may
7. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (rejecting the written-ness of
the Constitution as the primary means of constitutional interpretation).
8. See Mark Tushnet, The Universal and the Particular in Constitutional
Law: An Israeli Case Study, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1327 (2000) (stating that in the
United States, questions on constitutional issues lack a comparative analysis and
are often discussed in "parochial terms').
9. See id. (criticizing the lack of a comparative constitutional approach in the
United States). But see CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS Do 22-37 (2001) (providing an exception to the general lack of
comparative constitutional analysis by addressing South African
constitutionalism). However, the subject of Sunstein's book is not the role of text
in constitutionalism. Mark Tushnet comes close to addressing this issue from a
comparative constitutional position when he discusses formalism and
constitutional evolution in his book review. See Tushnet, supra note 8 (addressing
the reviewed book from a comparative constitutional perspective).
10. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that new constitutions have
recently arisen in democracies such as South Africa, Russia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Canada, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Slovakia).




prove critical in the early development of empowered
constitutionalism. 2 Israeli constitutionalism provides an especially
useful case study for this proposition because Israeli
constitutionalism reverses the usual American account of
constitutional development. The conventional description of
constitutional development in America upholds a written document
as the genesis of American constitutionalism. In contrast, Israeli
Supreme Court justices have crystallized judge-made law into the
textual basis for Israeli empowered constitutionalism. Thus,
analyzing Israel's constitutional development makes it possible to
examine textualism from a fresh perspective.
This article explores the relationship between empowered
constitutionalism in Israel and text in two parts. Part I evaluates the
function of empowered constitutionalism in a liberal democratic
state; a necessary antecedent inquiry given the difficulty of
investigating the importance of constitutional text without explaining
empowered constitutionalism's role in a democracy.13 Part I
undertakes this investigation by focusing on the law's ability to
maintain order in pluralist societies.
14
Part I begins by showing that empowered constitutionalism helps
governments to regulate the law's normative potential. 15 Law
assumes various narrative possibilities reflecting the individual
cultural narratives of the myriad communities that compose society.
Empowered constitutionalism serves as a stabilizing cultural
adhesive that enables the socially disaggregated groups that compose
12. See discussion infra Part II.A (exploring Israel's constitutional history).
This commitment to text need not be directed to the text of a constitution; it can
address other textual sources of normative authority, such as a Declaration of
Independence. Nevertheless, we may characterize this commitment to text as
constitutional because it uses non-constitutional text as either a foundation or
substitute for a constitution.
13. See discussion infra Part I (explaining that the mainstream conception of
American constitutionalism, which has its roots in a post-enlightenment
worldview, inadequately explains the connection between empowered
constitutionalism and the fulfillment of liberal democratic principles).
14. See discussion infra Part L.A (discussing post-enlightenment
constitutionalism)
15. See discussion infra Part I (explaining empowered constitutionalism's
function).
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nation-states to cohere by imagining themselves as a single, albeit
pluralist, community. Judicial review serves this process by ensuring
that the state's conception of society, codified as a basic set of
elementary aspirations in a constitution, controls the growth of
alternative social orders. Similarly, judicial review also makes the
government's internal narrative cohere. Part I further argues that the
cultural coherence that judicial review helps produce is especially
significant in light of the inherent instability of the nation-state, as
well as post-modem challenges to the nation-state's existence.
Part II uses Israel's constitutional experience to evaluate the role
of text in upholding the purpose of empowered constitutionalism
explained in Part 1.16 Part II first traces the history of Israeli
constitutionalism, explaining that the first Israeli parliament, the
Knesset, originally refused to establish a constitution. 7 The primary
reason for the Knesset's refusal was the new state's ambivalence
regarding Israeli constitutive aspirations.'8 Israeli leaders could not
decide whether Israel should exist as a secular liberal Jewish state
with an empowered constitution, or as a religious Jewish state
governed by the Halachic Code, Jewish law developed through
progressive rabbinical interpretation of the Torah.' 9 Instead of
-16. See discussion infra Part II (discussing written-ness and Israeli
constitutionalism).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A (exploring Israeli constitutional history and
explaining the Knesset's struggle with attempts at drafting a constitution).
18. See id. (noting the Knesset's failure to agree on a constitutional
formulation).
19. See S. ZALMAN ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA: JEWISH RELIGION IN THE
JEWISH STATE 97 (1976) (stating that the provisions of the Halachic Code, the law
of the Jewish people, address civil and criminal law, as well as purely devotional
matters and moral rules); see also ALBERT S. LINDEMANN, ESAU'S TEARS:
MODERN ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE RISE OF THE JEWS 40-124 (1997) (historicizing
Jewish communities in Europe with respect to Anti-Semitism and the rise of the
nation-state). The Halachic Code encompasses "Written Law," regulations that
appear in the Torah, and "Oral Law," interpretations and regulations based upon
the written rules. See ABRAMOV, supra. Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nasi compiled the Oral
Law toward the end of the Second Century, C.E. See id. at 98. Subsequent
religious thinkers further explicated the Oral Law. See id. This project became the
basis of the Talmud, the collection of rabbinical scholarship constituting the basis
of Jewish religious authority. See id. The Palestinian version of the Talmud was
edited at the end of the Fifth Century, C.E., and the Babylonian version of the
Talmud was edited at the end of the Sixth Century, C.E. See id. Many attempts to
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establishing a constitution, the Knesset determined that subseqent
embodiments of the Knesset would periodically enact Basic Laws. 0
The Basic Laws were meant to serve as independent provisions that
the Israeli government could ultimately combine into a single,
written constitution at some undetermined future time.21 However,
until 1992, none of the Basic Laws protected individual rights and
the Knesset had entrenched only a few of the Basic Laws against
ordinary legislative modification.22  Thus, there was nothing
particularly constitutional, at least from the standpoint of empowered
constitutionalism, about the Basic Laws passed by the Knesset prior
to 1992.23
In 1992, the Knesset passed two new Basic Laws that renewed the
promise of empowered constitutionalism in Israel.24 However, these
two Basic Laws merely codified human rights previously established
by the Israeli judiciary through caselaw. 25 The Israeli Supreme Court
ultimately had to decide two watershed cases, Kol Ha'Am26 and
produce a Talmudic code that would codify the Talmud and the precedential
rulings citing the Talmud followed. See id. Joseph Karo's attempt in the mid-
Sixteenth Century, C.E., is widely considered the standard Halachic Code. See
ABRAMOV, supra. The Halachic Code continued to evolve and serve as the
definitive source of Jewish law for Jewish communities in the Diaspora. See id.
The Halachic Code carries state-recognized force in Israel regarding religious
matters and matters of personal status touching upon religion, such as marriage and
divorce. See id. at 98-99, 208.
20. See infra notes 207-210 and accompanying text (describing the formulation
of Basic Laws).
21. See infra notes 211-211 and accompanying text (noting the Knesset's intent
that each Basic Law should serve as an independent, pro-constitutional law).
22. See infra notes 213-217 and accompanying text (discussing the
modification of the Basic Laws).
23. See id.
24. See infra notes 217-218 and accompanying text (discussing the 1992
"constitutional revolution" represented' by the passage of the Freedom of
Occupation and Human Dignity and Liberty Basic Laws).
25. See id.
26. See H.C. 73/53, 87/53, Kol Ha'Am Co., Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, 7
P.D. 871 (Isr. S. Ct), reprinted in I SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF TlE SUPREME
COURT OF ISRAEL: 1948-1953 90 (E. David Goitein ed., 1962) (concerning
whether a publication endangered the public peace).
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Mizrachi Bank," to actualize the implicit possibility of empowered
constitutionalism represented by the two Basic Laws.
Kol Ha 'Am and Mizrachi Bank are also significant because of the
manner in which the Israeli Supreme Court used text as a source of
normative authority to construct empowered constitutionalism.28 The
importance of text in the establishment of empowered
constitutionalism in Israel suggests that written-ness has substantial
constitutional significance. This article does not attempt to argue that
some species of originalism, textualism, or formalism should govern
constitutional interpretation. It does argue, however, that
contemporary scholarship should recognize that textualism of some
kind can serve as an important interpretive strategy in the





Part I of this article explicates the post-Enlightenment roots of
empowered constitutionalism as understood in the United States and
demonstrates why mainstream views regarding American
constitutionalism inadequately explains empowered
constitutionalism's role in a liberal society.30 Part I then builds upon
the scholarship of the late Robert Cover to describe an alternative
conception of constitutionalism.3  This alternative conception
depends upon viewing the law as primarily concerned with the
27. See C.A. 6821/93, Ha'Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal, P.D. 221 (Isr. S. Ct.),
reprinted in 31 ISRAEL L. REv. 764 (1997) (considering the violation of property
rights and the cancellation of debt).
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (providing further analysis of Kol Ha 'Am
and Mizrachi Bank).
29. As a secondary goal, this article attempts to raise critical questions
regarding the role of liberal traditions and constitutionalism in the service of the
nation-state.
30. See discussion infra Part I.B (explaining the deficiencies of the centrist
liberal constitutionalist position in addressing empowered constitutionalism).
31. See discussion infra Part I.C (arguing that constitutional jurispathy is
essential to the cultural stability of the nation-state).
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state's perpetuation of social control through the regulation of the
law's normative meaning.32
The law exists as a myriad of normative possibilities that reflect
the unique cultural narratives of the disparate communities
composing a society.33 Empowered constitutionalism is central to the
maintenance of cultural stability through the imposition of coercive
force that enables state control of the law's meaning via the power of
judicial review.34 Illustrating this process requires showing how the
official version of the law regulates the creation of alternative legal
orders, the Constitution's role in this process, and the relative
instability of the contemporary nation-state as a monolithic cultural
unit.35
A. POST-ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTIONALISM
Many historians view the late seventeenth and eighteenth century
philosophy of notables such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and
Kant, who celebrated the values of pre-Christian Greeks and
Romans, as a coherent body of work signaling the advent of
modernity. 36 The Enlightenment, as we have come to know this
period, shaped the ideas that help determine, in either adverse
32. See id. (discussing the relationship between social control and the
interpretation of laws).
33. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text (relating myth and narrative
to the legal views of different communities).
34. See discussion infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the manner in which
constitutionalism enables jurispathy).
35. See discussion infra Part I.C (analyzing the stabilizing influence of
common cultural referents and exploring the relationship between empowered
constitutionalism and the post-modem nation state).
36. See, e.g., MARK V. KAUPPI & PAUL R. VIOTTI, THE GLOBAL
PHILOSOPHERS: WORLD POLITICS IN WESTERN THOUGHT 184-97 (1992)
(explaining the philosophies of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, What is Enlightenment? in THE FOUCAULT READER 32 (Paul Rabinow
ed., 1984) (describing the cultural impact of the Enlightenment); MAX
HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, The Concept of Enlightenment, in THE
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY READER (Richard Kearny & Mara Rainwater eds.,
1996) (critiquing the Enlightenment).
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reaction, promotion, or passive acceptance, "what we are, what we
think, and what we do today."3
Enlightenment ideas permeate contemporary Western thought.38
The movement's general belief in secular values and its view of
humans as perfectible, rational beings inherently imbued with rights
and joined in a global community, has helped modem thinkers to
weave liberal notions of self-govemance, secular humanism, and
cosmopolitanism into the fabric of democratic ideals.
39
Enlightenment views of human nature and the characteristics of the
type of government best suited to accommodate that nature produce
two basic assumptions that shape the prevalent American
constitutionalist position, "post-Enlightenment constitutionalism."
First, an Enlightenment perspective tends to view democracy in
terms of self-government achievable through popular access to state
decision-making procedures. Second, an Enlightenment perspective
takes a complementary view of the Constitution's essential role in
maintaining democracy through the power of judicial review.
However, as this article will show, a close look at the theoretical
problems with judicial review raises serious questions regarding the
deeper function of empowered constitutionalism in a democratic
society. n
Post-Enlightenment constitutionalists commonly perceive
democracy as a type of government that sets up, in the words of John
Rawls, "a form of fair rivalry" 4' for political authority achieved
37. FOUCAULT, supra note 36, at 32.
38. See KAUPPI & VIOTTI, supra note 36, at 184-97 (demonstrating that the
Enlightenment influenced many thinkers); FOUCAULT, supra note 36, at 34-37
(relating the influence of the Enlightenment on Kant's approach to philosophy).
39. See Tony Judt, The New Old Nationalism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 26,
1994, at 50 (stating that the Enlightenment's brand of "optimistic universalism"
has also helped produce socialism, which competes with the liberal-democratic
worldview).
40. See discussion infra Part I.B (revealing conceptual problems with liberal
constitutionalism).
41. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 227 (1971). But see ROBERTA. DAHL,
How DEMOCRATIC Is THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 10 (2001) (claiming that
"democracy" is impossible to define with specificity, and characterizing
democratic regimes as generally enjoying significant amounts of internal political
rivalry while maintaining broad inclusiveness); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY:
PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1-9 (1971) (stating that "the development of a
[18:585
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through "just procedural rules. 42 The ultimate goal in this endeavor
is the establishment of a collective form of self-government
accomplished through electoral representation.43 A government may
embody these ideals in different ways. For example, Ronald
Dworkin conceives of democracy in terms of the substantive rights
that it aims to promote. 4 In Dworkin's view, democracy is a form of
collective government focused on maximizing self-government via
foundational laws that "rule out caste, guarantee a broad and
equitable political franchise, prevent arbitrary legal discriminations
and other oppressive uses of state powers, and assure governmental
respect for freedoms of thought, expression, and association and for
the intellectual and moral independence of every citizen. '45 On the
other hand, Robert Post envisions democracy from a procedural
standpoint.46 For Post, democracy is a system in which every citizen
who so chooses may enjoy a warranted sense of individual
contribution to the process of shaping the communal order. 47 A
system is thus democratic to the extent that its procedures ensure and
promote individual governance.
These disparate viewpoints share the idea that empowered
constitutionalism helps guarantee the maintenance of democracy.
Constitutionalism does this through "[t]he containment of popular
political decision-making by a basic law... designed to control
which further laws can be made, by whom, and by what
political system that allows for opposition, rivalry, or competition between a
government and its opponents is an important aspect of democratization); ROBERT
A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4 (1956) (arguing that "democracy
is an effort to bring off a compromise between the power of majorities and the
power of minorities").
42. See RAWLS, supra note 41 (considering the relationship between political
justice and the constitution).
43. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing the different ways
to approach the goal of self-government and electoral representation).
44. See MICHELMAN, supra note 3, at 17-18 (explaining Dworkin's concept of
democracy as focused on substantive rights rather than secondary, procedural
rights).
45. Id. at 18.
46. See id. at 34-38 (exploring Robert Post's responsive democracy theory).
47. See id. at 35 (explaining Post's conception of a lawmaking consensus of
"legally guaranteed access for everyone").
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procedures."48 Constitutions thereby provide the "laws of law-
making" that make constitutionalism possible. 49 This foundational
law ultimately rests on the power of judicial review, which grants the
U.S. Supreme Court the ultimate right to determine the
constitutionality, i.e., the democratic legitimacy, of state action.50
Thus, judicial review serves to regulate government's interaction
with the governed in a way that maintains predetermined public
rights essential to the liberal conception of democracy.5
It is therefore ironic that the implied predicate to the democratic
political order that post-Enlightenment constitutionalists espouse is
the counter-democratic institution of judicial review. Judicial review
paradoxically enables constitutional principles to promote
democratic aspirations through the judiciary's counter-majoritarian
supervision.5 2 According to conventional wisdom, judicial review of
48. See id. at 6.
49. See MICHELMAN, supra note 3. (discussing how the U.S. Constitution
contains popular political decision-making); see also Daniel J. Elazar,
Constitution-Making: The Pre-Eminently Political Act, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 11-12 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1990)
(describing constitutions as having three basic functions: providing the framework
of government, the moral bases for a polity, and a socio-economic power map for
society).
50. See MICHELMAN, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining how the U.S.
Constitution serves to contain popular political decision making).
51. See BONIME-BLANC, supra note 3, at 9-12 (citing Carl Friedrich's
description of constitutions as "effective regularized restraint" on government, and
Giovanni Sartori's description of constitutions as "techniques of liberty" that serve
"first and above all, [as] procedures intent upon ensuring a controlled exercise of
power"); see also MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
POLAND 6-9 (1998) (providing an analytical framework for exploring
constitutionalism, limited government, and transition to democracy); A.E. Dick
Howard & Mark F. Brzezinski, Development of Constitutionalism, in TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY IN POLAND 133 (Richard F. Staar ed., 1998) (discussing the
development of constitutionalism and stating that "the primary purpose of a
constitution is to describe the permissible scope and limits of governmental power
and to protect individual liberties").
52. See e.g. MICHELMAN, supra note 3, at 4-11 (relating how the Constitution
confines popular decision making); BONIME-BLANC, supra note 3, at 11-14
(exploring the interrelationship between regimes and constitutions, and the process
of establishing a constitution); Howard & Brzezinski, supra note 51, at 9-10
(noting that constitutional government is limited and restrained government);
RAWLS, supra note 41, at 228-43 (explaining how "[t]he extent of the principle of
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government action is necessary to prevent majorities from either
implicitly contradicting democratic ideals by oppressing minorities
through state action, or by explicitly voting society out of its
democratic character. 3  Judicial review supposedly upholds
democracy by entrusting the judiciary, as an entity that is perceived
of as relatively free from the pressures of electoral politics, with the
responsibility of policing state decisions for violations of
foundational law.
54
From the mainstream constitutionalist perspective, the neutral
application of justice via judicial review is the only way to ensure the
maintenance of the defining characteristics of democratic
government.55 Conventional wisdom maintains that a democratic
polity must rely on such a foundational law to guarantee: specific
rights (according to Ronald Dworkin);5 6 an egalitarian political
franchise (according to Robert Post);57 and equitable political
participation amidst competition for power (according to John
participation is defined as the degree to which the procedure of (bare) majority rule
is restricted by the mechanisms of constitutionalism").
53. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 26 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (stating that "[t]he
majoritarian process cannot be expected to rectify claims of minority rights that
arise as a response to the outcomes of that very majoritarian process").
54. See id. (advising that "[f]aith in the majoritarian process counsels
restraint"); MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 161 (1994) (arguing that the current system of
nomination to the Supreme Court is distinctly majoritarian because it is shaped
more directly by electoral politics than was previously true). But see MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing
that elected politicians may do a better job, or at least a comparable but more truly
democratic job, of enforcing the Constitution than judges under the current system
of judicial review). Tushnet perceives electoral pressures as shaping judicial
decisions and undermining the perceived integrity of judicial review, and
consequently advocates an end to the tyranny of judicial review by making
constitutional interpretation a populist endeavor. See id.
55. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (providing an account of the
restraints on government).
56. See MICHELMAN, supra note 3, at 17 (explaining Dworkin's conception of
democracy as a "cluster of substantive requirements").
57. See id. at 34 (exploring Post's procedural conception of democracy).
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Rawls). 8 Despite superficial differences, mainstream thinkers from
"Sunstein to Scalia," from left to right on the centrist band of the
ideological continuum, agree on the same basic liberal constitutional
attributes. 9 They believe in the possibilities of democracy and the
importance of the jurisdictional predominance of a neutral judiciary
as an integral component of democratic governance.6"
However, the mainstream constitutional perspective fails to
account fully for the role that empowered constitutionalism plays in
democratic governance. If judicial review is important because it
sustains democracy, then mainstream explanations fail to account for
the importance of empowered constitutionalism on conceptual
grounds. Conceptual problems with judicial review undermine
empowered constitutionalism's underlying assumptions, raising
serious questions concerning constitutionalism's role in a democratic
58. See RAWLS, supra note 41, at 221-28 (discussing political justice and the
Constitution in terms of competition).
59. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 67-68 (commenting on preservationist
constitutional views); see also David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of
a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7 (1999) (describing the adjudicative strategy
of center-left constitutionalists of the Warren Court); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1971). On the
one hand, center-right thinkers tend to stress the importance of preserving the
state's long-standing practices through relatively formal attachment to the original
and supposedly determinate meaning of the Constitution, or through the restraint of
the judiciary vis-A-vis the democratically legitimized powers of the electorate. On
the other hand, center-left constitutionalists lean toward interpreting the
Constitution in view of its immanent liberal potential in the hopes of transforming
the state into an idealized vision of democratic government. See SUNSTEIN, supra
note 9, at 67-68; see also Luban, supra, at 7. However, while conservative and
liberal constitutionalists may disagree about certain issues, such as the importance
of the Framer's original intentions, their differences arise only within a narrow
bank of variation in constitutional thinking. Thus, it is unsurprising that Robert H.
Bork, the conservative advocate of the originalist strand of preservationists, argued
that "[w]e have not carried the idea of neutrality far enough." See Bork, supra, at
7. Nor is it surprising that the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., the celebrated advocate of liberal constitutionalism, also upheld neutrality's
value by arguing that the judiciary's special role is to maintain the overall
impartiality of justice by policing majoritarian state action for the oppression of
minority elements in society lacking political influence. See Brennan, supra note
53, at 26.
60. See, e.g., Brennan supra note 53, at 26 (noting the importance of preserving




state. While these conceptual problems do not necessarily vitiate the
mainstream perspective in its entirety, they show the need for a fuller
explanation for constitutions' sociopolitical function.
B. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH THE MAINSTREAM
CONSTITUTIONALIST POSITION
Mainstream constitutionalism suffers from significant conceptual
problems stemming from its process-based approach to constitutional
adjudication. Mainstream constitutionalists widely uphold a process-
oriented approach to the law,6 which focuses on the challenge of
making the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review cohere
with post-Enlightenment notions of democracy.62 Process theorists
attempt to mediate the tension between the maintenance of
democratic processes and the perceived need for judicial review as a
component of empowered constitutionalism.
Process theorists resolve these contradictory impulses by linking
democratic governance with institutional competence. To the legal
process adherent, producing legally just results has less to do with
the content of laws than with the successful correlation of specific
legal conflicts and the institutional dispute resolution procedures best
suited to resolving each conflict in a manner consonant with
democratic decision-making. For example, a process approach to the
law might suggest that the bench is best suited to resolving legal
issues, while the legislature should have jurisdiction over issues
properly decided by the majoritarian operations of democratic
61. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:. LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 13-80 (1995) (providing an historical overview
of the development of legal process theory); Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller,
The Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683,
1688-89 (1998) (describing the proceduralist constitutional tradition); Gary Peller,
Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988) (discussing
whether the "Supreme Court utilized the proper institutional procedures for
decision making, defined by Wechsler as reasoning by "neutral principles"); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
(proposing a "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959) (arguing that "courts have the power, and duty, to decide all constitutional
cases in which the jurisdiction and procedural requirements are met").
62. See sources cited supra note 61.
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governance.63 It follows that applying the process approach to
constitutional adjudication entails determining which law-related
institution, the legislature, the Executive branch, or the judiciary,
should address a particular constitutional issue.
The problem with the legal process approach is that it ultimately
requires judges to identify legitimate democratic self-determination,
a highly subjective appraisal that belies judicial neutrality. 64 Judicial
responses to this challenge tend to fall toward either of two extremes:
formalism, which is often identified with the scholarship of Herbert
Wechsker, or functionalism, which is often identified with the
scholarship of John Hart Ely. On one hand, Wechsler's relatively
formalist approach emphasizes the facial maintenance of judicial
neutrality through broad deference to legislative decision-making.65
From Wechsler's perspective, judges may identify democracy
formally through signifiers such as the imprimatur of democratically
elected legislative representatives.
On the other hand, Ely's approach to process theory concentrates
on the de facto effect of law-making. The Ely approach ultimately
requires judges to analyze the content of state processes for
substantive fulfillment of democratic values.66 Judges thus recognize
democracy functionally, as a result of substantive analysis of the
conditions underlying state decision-making.
Both the Wechsler (formalist) and Ely (functional) approaches
contradict mainstream ideas about democracy. A formalist proponent
of process theory would argue that democracy remains free of the
danger of a politically interventionist legal tyranny so long as the
judiciary eschews social policy questions. However, this argument
assumes the democratic adequacy of state decision-making while
ignoring evidence that elections and representative governance occur
against background socioeconomic conditions that create systemic
63. See id.
64. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 61, at 1697-1705 (discussing the
inherent contradictions of process theory approaches to constitutionalism).
65. See Wechsler, supra note 61.
66. See ELY, supra note 61.
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biases against particular groups in American society.67 Thus, state
procedure facially appears to be democratic, while the decisions
generated by that procedure are skewed by systemic bias, thereby
undermining the practice of democratic government.68
For example, police officers, regardless of their ethnicity, are more
likely to be suspicious of black rather than white citizens while
investigating criminal activity. 69 This is because police officers, like
all Americans, are subject to the unconscious internalization of
stereotypes regarding black Americans.70 Judges evaluating some of
the cases resulting from these police investigations for the violation
of constitutional rights will likely only confirm the de jure guarantee
of individual rights, rather than noticing the prejudicial application of
police action that initially undermines those rights. This dynamic
ultimately devalues the constitutional rights supposedly protected by
judicial scrutiny.
William J. Stuntz provides a related example of the difficulties
that may arise when the judiciary commits itself to the evident social
equality of constitutional jurisprudence without acknowledging the
substantive impact of the factors underlying that jurisprudence.71
67. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 20 (1999) (providing an example of
judicial bias and noting that the reasonable person standard has different effects on
the poor, the wealthy, ethnic minorities, and whites).
68. See id. at 41 (citing an example in which fifty-six percent of Americans,
regardless of ethnicity, believe that blacks are more prone to violence than are
other Americans). Since this bias affects the majority of Americans, institutional
decision-makers' prejudicial cognitive stereotypes may skew facially democratic
state action. See id. Reverend Jesse Jackson once stated that, "There is nothing
more painful to me... than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start
thinking about robbery-then look around and see somebody white and feel
relieved." Id. It is reasonable to conclude on the basis of this evidence that if many
Americans, including civil rights leaders such as Jesse Jackson, suffer from
internalized associations of skin color with crime, then so may state actors such as
police officers and judges. These inherent biases may influence the practical
application of superficially equitable democratic procedures.
69. See id. at 20-21 (arguing that police disproportionately suspect black
citizens of committing crimes and therefore single blacks out for investigatory
searches).
70. See id. at 40-41 (noting that law enforcement officials are susceptible to
forming the same biases as the general population).
71. See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1265-66 (1999) (suggesting that such underlying biases
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Stuntz focuses on the political economy of judicial protection from
unauthorized searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.72 He points out that the manner in which the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined Fourth Amendment privacy
interests in terms of property privileges wealthier suspects at the
expense of poorer suspects.73
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment74 as
protecting individual privacy from arbitrary searches and seizures by
law enforcement agencies.75 Generally speaking, the greater the
perceived invasion of privacy, the greater the justification required of
law enforcement to perform a search or seizure of the invaded
property under the Fourth Amendment.76 According to Stuntz, the
have led the justice system to target poor and black people with relatively greater
frequency than other citizens).
72. See id. at 1274-77 (noting that it is more cost-effective to police criminal
activity in poorer neighborhoods).
73. See id. at 1266-67 (proposing that the privacy interests of wealthier citizens
enjoy greater protection from society because wealthier citizens tend to possess the
places and things that are granted enhanced protection under Fourth Amendment
caselaw); see also CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 48-54 (1998)
(arguing that the strategic organization of advocacy groups, such as the American
Civil Liberties Union, resulted in the Supreme Court's recognition of individual
rights such as freedom of expression, criminal procedure, and women's rights, in
the last half of the twentieth century). Epp notes that this organized advocacy was
contingent upon the development of a complex and expensive support structure for
legal mobilization. See id. at 44. Thus, financial resources emerge as a de facto
insurance o*f "democratic" access to the judiciary. See id. It is possible to interpret
this as another example of the manner in which wealth skews the otherwise
equitable exercise of constitutional rights in our society.
74. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV (providing a statutory basis for protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures).
75. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15"(1948) (expressing a
judicial preference for warrants to protect citizens from potentially arbitrary
searches and seizures).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that police
do not require justification to scrutinize street activity); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (finding that police may search a pedestrian's pocket where there is
both reasonable suspicion that the pocket contains a weapon and there is
reasonable suspicion that the pedestrian was involved in criminal activity);
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (ruling that police may search a car if
there is probable cause, a higher standard than reasonable suspicion, to believe that
there is evidence of a crime in the car); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 395
(1978) (noting that police may search inside a home only where there is probable
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practical result of this graded distribution of rights is that it is more
difficult under the Constitution to search property that is likely to be
held by wealthier citizens.7"
Furthermore, Stuntz notes that the Fourth Amendment makes it
more efficient for law enforcement agencies to police crime in poorer
rather than wealthier neighborhoods.7" This is because wealthier
citizens tend to own homes, which require a relatively high
justification to search, and have the means necessary to hire lawyers
to bring suits against police for improper searches and seizures of
property.7 9 Therefore, it is more demanding, both in terms of the time
required to obtain proper search warrants and the resources required
to adjudicate cases against aggrieved citizens, for law enforcement
agencies to target crime that takes place in relatively wealthy
neighborhoods.8" The result is that police tend to enforce the law
inequitably with respect to crimes related to Fourth Amendment
rights. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence thereby fulfills the formal
requirements of equality promised by American constitutionalism,
while simultaneously failing to satisfy the content of that promise.
The Ely-functional strand of the neutral process approach to
constitutional jurisprudence also suffers from a theoretical
inconsistency based upon the difficulty in identifying democratic
legitimacy in the law. Adherents of Ely's approach recognize the
hollowness of assuming the democratic nature of legislation and
presumptively deferring to legislative decisions.1 Ely's proponents
respond to this problem by requiring the judiciary to evaluate state
cause to believe that the home contains evidence of criminal activity and the police
previously obtained a warrant to search the home).
77. See Stuntz, supra note 71, at 1267-74 (stating that the courts' definition of
privacy tends to favor the interests of wealthier people).
78. See id. at 1276 (commenting that it is more expensive for the police to
monitor wealthier neighborhoods).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1275 (noting that it is costly and burdensome for police officers
to obtain search warrants).
81. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 61, at 1696 ("[i]f the basis for deference
to the legislature is its democratic character, such deference is inappropriate when
the legislature calls its own democratic character into question ... or when it
legislates about the interests of groups that majoritaria democracy is poorly
structured to consider, such as the interests of discrete and insular minorities.").
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action with respect to de facto democratic effects, as well as
democratic form.82 Thus, a judge operating from Ely's perspective
might identify problems with the practical application of a criminal
justice system that appears to equitably protect the rights of all
Americans while actually producing a disproportionately negative
impact on some Americans.
However, the Ely-functional approach fails to limit judicial power.
Taken seriously, the Ely perspective violates democracy's central
aim, collective self-government accomplished through elected
representation, by ultimately giving judges the counter-majoritarian
power to decide what democracy itself means. This problem arises
because the characteristics signifying democracy are ultimately
indeterminate.83 For example, contrary to mainstream opinion, some
argue that hate speech hinders free expression under the Constitution
by helping to construct a negative social image of targeted minority
groups, thereby devaluing those groups' public voices.84 This raises
the question whether a true democracy should allow hate speech as a
form of constitutionally-guaranteed free expression, or outlaw hate
speech as a challenge to constitutionally-guaranteed expression?85
The indeterminacy revealed by such questions complicates any
reasonable judicial attempt to identify the basic yet elusive values
announced in the Constitution.86
82. See ELY, supra note 61.
83. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 61, at 1699 (stating that democratic
principles are not easily defined).
84. Compare MAR J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 24-25 (1993)
(arguing that the negative effects of hate speech ultimately restrict the victims'
own personal freedom) with Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights,
and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 26 (1985) (presenting a similar line of
argument concerning the relationship between pornography and women's freedom
of expression) and Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,
Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 17 (1985) (stating that
women's public voices are silenced by the portrayal of women in pornography).
85. See generally Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or
Contradiction of Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 789 (1996)
(discussing whether hate speech actually hinders freedom of expression for some
groups).
86. See id.; see also Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 916-19 (1978) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (noting that these considerations can be difficult for judges). This
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Based upon the evidence presented above, mainstream views fail
to completely justify constitutionalism in general, and judicial
review, in particular, as predicates to democracy. This conclusion
does not categorically reject empowered constitutionalism's role in
democratic governance, or the maintenance of some notion of justice
consonant with democracy. However, at the very least, the above
analysis suggests that constitutionalism plays some other core
function in state governance than the standard account offered by
centrist thinkers. It also suggests that this core function has little to
do with reinforcing democracy as conceived of by mainstream
constitutionalists. The late Robert Cover's vision of society as
composed of rival normative legal worlds overlaying a single
authoritative legal regime, offers an alternative explanation for
empowered constitutionalism that may better explain the
Constitution's function in American society.
C. CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CONTROL OF LEGAL MEANING
Robert Cover suggested that constitutions serve primarily to
facilitate the state's control of society through the imposition of a
hierarchy of legal meaning.87 According to Cover, legal codifications
opinion concerns the Supreme Court's decision to decline review of the Seventh
Circuit's invalidation of ordinances that attempted to restrict demonstrations by
neo-Nazis in Skokie, Illinois, a town with a large Jewish population. See id. The
dissent notes that "when citizens assert ... that the proposed demonstration is
scheduled at a place and in a manner that is taunting and overwhelmingly offensive
to the citizens of that place, that assertion, uncomfortable though it may be for
judges, deserves to be examined." Id. at 919.
87. See ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS
OF ROBERT COVER 96 (Martha Minow, et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter COVER,
ESSAYS] (noting that legal prescriptions require cultural narratives to give them
meaning). See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) [hereinafter COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED] (discussing
the judicial response to fugitive slave laws). Cf Peter Gabel, The Bank Teller: The
Experiential Origins of Hierarchy; Founding Father Knows Best: The Search By
the Framed for the Intent of the Framers, in THE BANK TELLER AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF MEANING (2000). Gabel's view of constitutionalism
coheres with Cover's ideas to the extent that both thinkers agree that society uses
the law to impose hierarchical orders of control upon citizens. However, whereas
Cover suggests that this order is necessary in the maintenance of pluralist
communities, Gabel rejects it from a "psycho-political" perspective. Gabel sees
this attempt at community formation as an ultimately alienating experience by
which we imagine completely artificial identities as "citizens," a "fantasized
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such as the U.S. Constitution lack inherent meaning.88 Cultural
narratives imbue the unadorned "black letter" of legal precept with
significance by locating rules in a socially-constructed normative
legal universe-a "nomos."89 Society is composed of multiple nomoi
that compete over the law's meaning with respect to shared legal
codifications.90 The legal system responds directly to the challenge to
interpretive dominance represented by these normative possibilities
through "jurispathy,"' the destruction of rival normative systems,
and the regulation of "jurisgenesis," 92 the creation of legal meaning.
This article builds on Cover's ideas to show that the Constitution
is integral to the law's jurispathic function and that constitutional
jurispathy is essential to the cultural stability of the nation-state. This
argument has three components. First, states employ coercion to
regulate jurisgenesis. Second, empowered constitutionalism
facilitates this coercion by establishing jurisdiction and imposing
cultural boundaries on the law's potential meaning. This boundary-
setting also has an important stabilizing effect on the law's evolution.
Third, empowered constitutionalism emerges as an important way of
maintaining coherent cultural communities given the challenges
faced by the contemporary nation-state.
1. Legal Narratives and the Determination of Law Through Violence
According to Cover, a "nomos" combines myth and narrative to
imbue a body of law with meaning that is unique to a particular
community. 93 Myths are the stories that undergird communal self-
common image of connection whose fantasy-based nature is collectively denied."
Id. at 143. Thus, according to Gabel, the Constitution serves as a fetish object in
the mass consciousness, which prevents citizens from realizing their immanent and
true inter-connections as human beings.
88. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 96 (stating that narratives are what
give the Constitution its meaning).
89. See id. at 95-102 (defining nomos as a normative universe that influences
human behavior through myth).
90. See id. at 103-13 (noting that competing laws arise within a single society).
91. See id. at 138-44 (defining jurispathy as the way in which courts destroy
rival legal normative systems).
92. See id. at 103 '(defining jurisgenesis as the creation of legal meaning).
93. Id. at 100-01 (stating that myths imbue the law with meaning).
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understanding, providing "paradigms of behavior" constructed out of
imagined patterns in a community's history.94 For example, the
notion of America's founders as spiritual pilgrims seeking religious
independence .from Protestant oppression overseas is a story
commonly understood as an expression of American commitment to
religious tolerance and freedom. Cover argues that narratives convey
these stories as a function of relating a community's vision of an
imagined past with that community's present.95 Thus, grade school
children re-enacting the first Thanksgiving feast at Plymouth Rock
express a narrative that implicitly affirms a commitment to social
values animated by a communal understanding of the Thanksgiving
myth. Culture is the medium for the expression of this narrative.96
Interwoven cultural narratives form a universe of social norms, a
bounded nomos that shapes how people absorb and comprehend
ideas.9" Cover notes that nomoi include ideas about the meaning of
legal precepts. 98 Nomoi thus permeate legal rules with meaning that
is particular to a community by situating those rules within a
universe of social norms.99 This socially constructed meaning allows
the law to assume significance in diverse contexts ranging from
banal legal doctrine applied to mundane affairs, to apologetic
94. COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 88, at 101 (explaining the purpose of myths).
95. See id. at 101 (explaining that myths provide insight into the past that can
serve as a vision for the present).
96. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE LONG REVOLUTION 41 (1961) (defining
culture as the social construction of reality, the whole of a "particular way of life
which expresses certain meanings and values" nurtured at the interstices of human
interaction); see also Louis ALTHUSSER, FOR MARx 230-36 (1969) (defining
culture as a system of myths that govern society's behavior); DICK HEBDIGE,
SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE 5-15 (1979) (discussing the meaning of
culture); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, in CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD
WAR: ARGUMENTS ON CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE 290 (Richard K. Betts ed.,
1994) (positing that cultures are not rigid, monolithic, or clearly delineated, but are
instead porous, overlapping, and capable of shading into each other without
definite boundaries).
97. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 101 (explaining that cultural
narratives help shape social norms).
98. See id. at 98-99 ("The normative universe is held together by the force.of
interpretive commitments... [which] define what law means and what law should
be").
99. See id. at 102 (describing the relationship between legal meaning, nomoi,
and communities).
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justifications for legal coercion, to criticism of the extant legal
order.1"0 Thus, as Cover explains, narratives inhere the law in
community life by relating rules to the universe of normative
contained within a particular nomos.
Nomoi engage in a constant state of jurisgenesis that often
competes with the state's claim to the exclusive power to regulate the
law's meaning. 10 1 This competition involves the nomos seeking to
carve out an independent interpretive space for itself from the state's
legal plenitude. This nomic jurisgenesis is potentially unlimited
because a community's self-conception changes in dynamic inter-
relation to the state's nomic conception. Thus, nomoi and the
narratives that structure nomoi are unstable.
Nomoi may also directly challenge the state's power over legal
meaning by seeking to transform the political-social order of the
dominant regime." 2 An example of such a nomos lies in the radical
constitutionalist camp of anti-slavery abolitionists who fought for the
100. Id. at 101.
101. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 121-27 (illustrating jurisgenesis and
explaining this concept by discussing the Church of God in Christ, Mennonite's
amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United
States). Cover argues that the amicus brief illustrates both a nomos and the manner
in which nomic jurisgenesis may challenge the state's legal meta-order. See id. at
126. In the brief, the Mennonites expressed their support for an interpretation of
the free exercise of religion and free association clauses of the Constitution's First
Amendment that would have permitted discrimination against black university
applicants on the basis of religious belief. See id. at 124. As Cover explains, the
brief is a concise illustration of nomic formation because it clearly articulated the
Mennonite cultural narrative with respect to the religious and associational
freedoms supposedly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id. at 125-26. The
narrative offered three cultural referents that defined the Mennonites' nomos: (1) a
vision of an antecedent group of First Century Christians that served as the fixed
point in the contemporary Mennonites' experience of social history; (2) visions of
historical reoccurrence of oppression towards groups with which contemporary
Mennonites associated themselves; and (3) the shared Mennonite self-
conceptualization as a community dedicated to the preceding visions. See id. at
122-23. This self-conception provided an insular meaning for the Mennonites to
the plain language of the First Amendment. This insular meaning deviated from
and competed with the state's governing legal definition of the Amendment.
102. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 142 (positing that communities may
challenge the state over legal meaning).
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manumission of American slaves preceding the Civil War.103 Radical
constitutionalists hoped to bring an end to slavery by altering the
Constitution to eliminate any possible constitutional justification for
the practice of slavery. 1° Whether a community conflicts directly or
indirectly with the state over legal meaning, such conflict
necessitates grappling with the coercive civil order of the state. The
state's legal regime typically responds with the instrument of control
monopolized by governments in contemporary society: violence.
The state is just one contestant among many for generating and
implementing socio-legal norms. However, the state is better suited
to compel commitment to its norms than any other collective body
within the nation-state through the effective management of
violence. This is because the state is better able to organize violence
than any other societal entity in the contemporary nation-state.
Explaining why this is true first requires defining the "state." The
state is that over-arching institution preeminently concerned with
order maintenance. 105 The state monopolizes organizations capable of
implementing the force necessary to coerce norm commitment, such
as the police and the military, and organizations with the ability to
sanction that implementation in the regulation ofjurisgenesis through
the state's judicial dominion over legal meaning such as the courts.
0 6
103. See id. at 133-38 (providing an example of how different groups challenged
state power).
104. See id. (detailing the abolitionist perspective with respect to the
Constitution); see also COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 87 (providing an
extensive discussion of the judiciary's role in preventing manumission and the
state's role in imposing law). Cover shows how and why judges with anti-
abolitionist sentiments could interpret the law in a way that contradicted their
personal moral viewpoints. See id.
105. See Gellner, supra note 96, at 282-83 (providing a definition of the state).
106. See id. (building on Max Weber's definition of the state as that agency
within society possessing a monopoly on legitimate violence). In contrast to
Weber, Gellner aptly points out that societies do not necessarily monopolize
legitimate violence. See id. Gellner offers the example of the feudal state, in which
a lord may allow his vassals to war upon each other so long as they remain loyal to
their overlord. See id. At the very least, it is possible to surmise that the state
monopolizes the force necessary to compel widespread commitment to norms.
This may also often include a monopoly on legitimate violence, as is the case in
our own society.
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The state retains its legal primacy through jurispathy.' ° Although
some might argue that the state's legal regime merely makes the law
clear by distinguishing proper interpretation of the law from
erroneous interpretation, this viewpoint assumes that the state's
reigning legal interpretation is qualitatively better than that offered
by non-state sources. 08 Assuming, as Cover does, that society exists
as a poly-centric universe of juridical potential consisting of multiple
nomoi capable of imbuing rules with social meaning, then the state's
interpretation of law has more to do with the control of jurisgenesis
than the inherent superiority of the state's legal analysis. Justice
Jackson raised this point in Brown v. Allen when he stated with
respect to the U.S. Supreme Court that "[w]e are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."'19
Thus, jurispathy serves to distinguish what is privileged as "law"
(state interpretation of legal precept) from the other nomic
possibilities that may arise within society.
The state creates law by destroying and circumscribing alternative
legal possibilities as a function of regulating society. The state may
allow certain nomic communities to survive as relatively independent
preserves when such action serves governmental ends. For example,
the U.S. government has allowed company towns to assert the right
to independent legal enforcement with respect to labor relations." 0
Alternatively, the state may choose to destroy other nomic
communities that challenge state supremacy regarding legal
meaning. Producing an ordered socio-legal system via either strategy
requires the state to manage the application of jurispathy. Courts
enforce jurispathy by employing coercive force ranging from parking
107. Cover views "jurispathy" as a negative, violent thing that a state should
apply sparingly, if at all. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 88, at 1-2. In contrast,
this article uses the term in a neutral, descriptive manner.
108. See id. (emphasizing the placement of communal groups-groups that
would seem peripheral if the government's worldview were the starting point-at
the center of law).
109. 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
110. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 127-28 (noting that the U.S.




tickets to court injunctions and executions.' Constitutionalism is
central to the regulation of legal meaning.
2. Empowered Constitutionalism and Jurispathy
a. Jurisdiction
Cover's analysis neglected to address fully how constitutionalism
enables jurispathy. Empowered constitutionalism uses judicial
review to help establish extra-state and intra-state boundaries that
facilitate the state's control over the law's meaning. One way in
which the U.S. Constitution enables extra-state jurispathy is through
the establishment of the power of jurisdiction, the right of courts to
apply the law."2 The Constitution, as the rule of rules within the
American legal system, ultimately provides the raw material that
judicial narratives use to uphold the jurisdiction of courts." 3 Judges
invoke their explicit power and right to apply the law under the
111. See COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 87, at 203 (asserting that legal
interpretive acts signal and cause violence upon others). These acts justify violence
that has already occurred or which is about to occur, frequently leaving behind
victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of
violence. See id. Cover further provides a description of the nature and range of the
coercion forces. See id.
112. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 155-62 (describing the importance
of jurisdiction in creating the state's legal hierarchy). However, this article's
discussion regarding boundary-setting and empowered constitutionalism with
respect to stabilizing cultural referents is entirely original.
113. See id. at 156 (noting that judges appeal to the "texts of jurisdiction" and
that "[t]he most basic of [these] are the apologies for the state itself and for its
violence-the ideology of social contract or the rationalizations of the welfare
state"). Cover does not explicitly state that the Constitution upholds jurisdiction,
although he does discuss the importance of jurisdiction to the law. See id.
However, a judge adjudicating a case must appeal to a particular rule, and cases
involving core social issues involve constitutional rules. Also, the "texts of
jurisdiction" that Cover mentions are narratives generally built around the notion
of a single constitutive law extending directly from the social contract-the
Constitution. Cover himself notes that, "[m]any ... historical narratives treat the
Constitution as foundational ... and generative of all that comes after." Id. Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude that the Constitution ultimately establishes jurisdiction.
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Constitution of the United States, invoking the Constitution's
declaration of itself as "Supreme Law."" 
4
Jurisdiction is the institutional decree that conceptually separates
judicial authority from the object of that authority. Jurisdiction thus
facilitates the control of society by allowing judges to clothe the
brute display ofjurispathy that is the rule of law with the pretense of
civilized legitimacy."' Absent this division, the implicit connection
between judicial interpretation of the law and the arbitrariness and
force that characterize law enforcement would become explicit. This
revelation would jeopardize the apparent neutrality of the rule of law
that underlies mainstream constitutional narratives, thereby
undermining widespread acquiescence to the law as an even-handed
mechanism of justice.
Jurisdiction also provides an institutional excuse for judges to
perpetuate the state's monopoly over jurispathy by privileging
hierarchy over substantive justice in adjudication." 6 For example, in
Walker v. City of Birmingham,"7 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
review a trial court's injunction prohibiting a civil rights protest on
the merits, despite admitting that the injunction was most likely
unconstitutional." 8 The Supreme Court based this decision on the
fact that the civil rights demonstrators at issue had willfully violated
the lower court's questionable injunction." 9 The Walker decision
114. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land").
115. See COVER, ESSAYS, supra note 87, at 159-63 (asserting that judges
consider maintenance of authority over substantive principles of justice when
adjudicating).
116. See id. at 157-58 (providing Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967) as an example of the Supreme Court privileging authority over justice); cf,
Owen Fiss, Civilizing Hand of the Law? Birmingham, 1963, 89 YALE REV. 1
(2001) (asserting that the Walker decisions shows that the Supreme Court's focus
had begun to change from dismantling Jim Crow to maintaining law and order),
available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/faculty/omf2/pdf files/handofthelaw.pdf
(last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
117. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 315-17 (repeating the demonstrators' statements that the
injunction was "raw tyranny under the guise of maintaining law and order").
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thus exemplifies the law's preeminent concern with upholding the
extant legal power structure at the expense of the substantive
principles of justice in question in any particular case.
b. The Stabilizing Influence of Common Cultural Referents
Another way in which constitutionalism enables jurispathy is
through the setting of shared narrative focal points, "common
cultural referents," which impose boundaries on the law's meaning
both within and outside of the state. The Bill of Rights imposes these
boundaries through a general textual focus on certain social values,
such as the freedom of speech, which Americans may variably
interpret. 120 The bare text of constitutional rules provides a basic
shape to the varying legal narratives draped over the unadorned
words of the Constitution. This underlying shape serves as a common
referent for diverse nomic communities. A common referent limits
the conceptual possibilities of jurisgenesis by ensuring that all of the
variable meanings attributed to the law must relate to the
Constitution's text in some way."12
This boundary-setting function is critical to state maintenance not
only as a means of regulating competing versions of the law, but
perhaps more importantly, by stabilizing the law's inevitable
evolution. The state codifies its nomic identity to establish cultural
referents via empowered constitutionalism. 22 However, the state
never fully captures its nomos in a rigid formula.'23 Instead, the state,
120. This is not to say that text is the only way in which empowered
constitutionalism creates common cultural referents. It merely points out that the
Constitution's text serves this purpose in American constitutionalism.
121. Cf, Strauss, supra note 6, at 879 (suggesting that the Constitution's
meaning evolves through caselaw in a process much like the development of the
common law). According to Strauss, the Constitution provides "focal points" that
serve as rules of the game, so to speak, when constitutional disputes arise. See id.
The Constitution thereby serves as a protocol for its own evolving meaning
122. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 160-63 (1991) (offering a popular
account of how this process may occur through constituent assemblies).
123. See id. (asserting that effective constituent assemblies are most likely to
exist in "constitutional moments" when the state is particularly focused on issues
affecting the fundamental organization of a polity). Thus, a constituent assembly is
likely to be more public-spirited and less politically selfish than other state bodies.
See id. This suggests that the state's nomic conception is fluid.
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when it has determined an initial set of constitutive aspirations,
creates a constitution, written or unwritten, which fixes the
aforementioned cultural referents.124  These initial aspirations
establish little as a matter of substance. Indeed, the aspirations
initially set merely prescribe some starting points concerning societal
priorities. The meaning of these priorities changes over time as
judges, the citizens composing society, and other state actors
progressively develop narratives that overlay these fixed cultural
referents. While these narratives evolve constantly, the common
constitutional referents that the narratives incorporate remain fixed.
The common cultural referents thereby stabilize the evolution of
constitutional meaning.
Empowered constitutionalism also exercises this stabilizing
limitation on jurisgenesis within the state, as well as outiside of the
state. Failure to examine intra-state jurisgenesis obscures a vital
constitutional function: the subordination of jurisgenesis within the
state to the state's own nomic self-conception. 25 State existence is
jeopardized when empowered constitutionalism does not exist to
stabilize the official version of the rule of law and to make it cohere
internally. This is particularly true given that state actors often
compete for power over the direction of state action. For example,
Jim Crow presented a conceptual as well as geographical fissure in
the state nomos built out of America's narratives of freedom.'26
American's legal order claimed to ensure the rights of all citizens, at
least as a de jure, if not a de facto, matter. 27 However, in the South,
to paraphrase Martin Luther King, the narratives of justice and
124. See id. (noting that public spirit uniquely qualifies a constituent assembly to
establish constitutional provisions).
125. See COVER, EsSAYS, supra note 87 (arguing that the purpose of the law is
to maintain order in society by regulating jurisgenesis). Cover did not explore the
topic of intra-state jurisgenesis. He analyzed the law from a counter-statist
perspective focused on the adversarial relationship between the communities that
compose society and the government. Such a one-sided perspective recognizes
narratives that compete with the state, while neglecting the existence of competing
narratives within the state.
126. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22-29 (3d
ed. 1974) (discussing segregation in America during the Jim Crow era).
127. See id. (tracing legal developments in the wake of Jim Crow).
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freedom promoted segregation policies that made differential
treatment based on skin color legal.
28
This fracture in the state nomos threatened to create the kind of
social crisis over legal meaning that empowered constitutionalism
helps to prevent by forcing governments, as well as non-state
proponents of rival legal orders, to conform their activities to the
contours of a universally-shared legal meta-precept bounded by
common cultural referents. Rival legal narratives may permeate these
precepts with disparate meanings. However, the existence of shared
precepts serves to focus rule comprehension, making arbitrary action
more difficult on the government's part, and thus circumscribing the
use of state force. This mediates the tension between law, social
stability, and the myriad normative possibilities that both challenge
and enrich the formation of any society.
For example, if the Warren Court had not invoked the power of
judicial review to dismantle institutionalized segregation, it is not
unreasonable to predict that African Americans would have widely
and violently rebelled against their oppression. 29 Instead, the U.S.
Supreme Court imposed its own narrative on this nation's legal
regime, killing off Jim Crow's rival normative interpretation of the
law. 130 The Warren Court thereby created a coherent and uniform
nomos for the state with respect to race under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.
Outside of the state, constitutional boundary-setting delineates
state authority from non-state dissent in interpretation of law.
Cover's example of the Mennonite's amicus curiae brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court in Bob Jones v. United States'3' articulated the effect
128. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 83 (1964).
129. There is no doubt that many people fought to dismantle Jim Crow through
both peaceful and violent means. However, at no point did this resistance to Jim
Crow reach the point of a popular uprising that threatened the existence of the
American state.
130. The point here is not that the Constitution enabled the Justices of the
Warren Court to propagate democratic freedom in America. Indeed, as this article
has noted, many would argue strongly that democratic freedom is still very much
in question in America.
131. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The example is taken from COVER, ESSAYS, supra
note 87, at 121-27 (asserting that the structure of the Anabaptist nomos determines
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of this boundary-setting. In the brief, the Mennonites argued in favor
of their understanding of the First Amendment. The Mennonites
interpreted the words of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and
Free Association clauses in a different manner than did the
government, reflecting the cultural narratives of the Mennonites'
unique nomos. However, both the authoritative government
interpretation and the Mennonites' rival understanding of the law
referred to the salient value of religion and the right of association
expressed by the text of the Constitution's First Amendment. These
First Amendment rights therefore served as common cultural
referents that created an imagined boundary between the state's
"legitimate" interpretation of the law and the opposing interpretation
of the Mennonites.
This type of boundary serves as an excuse for the state to commit
jurispathy against dissenting interpretations of the law whenever
nomic belief systems clash over the law's meaning. Just as
jurisdiction separates judges from the violence of the law, the
boundary also upholds the law's apparent neutrality by disguising the
state's often arbitrary use of the law to impose control on society
through force. Furthermore, common cultural referents perform an
even more important function with respect to the maintenance of the
nation-state.
3. Empowered Constitutionalism and the Post-Modern Nation-State
Nation-states are inherently unstable from a cultural perspective
because they exist as arbitrary groupings of cultures.'32
Consequently, the essential challenge of nation-states is the
consolidation of diverse cultures into single, relatively stable
political units.'33 Making culture and polity congruent within one
geopolitical body requires enabling the diverse citizens of nation-
states to imagine themselves as part of a single community organized
the communities within it, and therefore the meaning of the principle of free
exercise of religion enunciated in the U.S. Constitution).
132. See Gellner, supra note 96, at 286.
133. This cultural diversity includes the myriad political actors composing the
state.
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within a specified geographical space and beneath the aegis of a
single state.
34
Two factors complicate the effort to imagine the national
community. First, the post-modem erosion of geopolitical and
national-cultural borders hampers the nation-state's coherence as a
community.'35 Ironically, the same factors that helped enable the rise
of the nation-state through the ability to create "imaginary
communities" have progressively helped erase national borders.
3 6
Advances in travel and telecommunications have made it
134. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 5-6 (1991) (arguing that nationalism,
dedication to the nation-state as a fundamental unit of social organization, is a
cultural invention). Anderson notes that nations are imagined entities because "the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion." Id. at 6. Nationalism arose toward the end of the
eighteenth century in response to the complex interaction of social forces and
technological innovations associated with the rise of modernity, which enabled
people to imagine themselves as parts of large communities. See id. at 9. These
factors helped create and magnify perceived political and cultural intra-
connections with the nation-state. See id.
135. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 58 (1998)
("[p]ostmodemity is distinguished by a dramatic restructuring of capitalism in the
postwar period, a reconstructing of labor and capital markets, the displacement of
production relations to nonmetropolitan regions, the consolidation of mass
communications in corporate conglomerates, and the pervasive penetration of
electronic media and information technologies.").
136. See, e.g., Richard Falk, Revisioning Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 57-60 (Martha C. Nussbaum ed.,
1996) (discussing the role that modem communications capabilities play in erasing
national borders); John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and
the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 903,
915-17 (1996) (describing the impact of international legal agreements on national
sovereignty); Oscar Schacter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications
For International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 19-21 (1997) (explaining
that international legal bodies need to balance popular sovereignty and the
sustainability of individual states); William H. Lash, III, The Decline of the Nation
State in International Trade and Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1011 (1996)
(addressing the decline of the nation state); Peter J. Spiro, The Decline of the
Nation State and Its Effect on Constitutional and International Law: New Global
Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the 'Unregulated Marketplace,'
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996) (examining nongovernmental organizations' role
in the decline of the nation state); JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI AND JAMES FALK, THE
END OF SOVEREIGNTY? (1992).
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increasingly easy not only to establish social connections with other
areas of the world, but to experience these connections physically as
well.137 Citizens gradually cease to understand themselves as
"citizens," as they find new ways to understand their relationships
with people in other parts of the world. 38 This broadened perspective
has undermined the relevance of constructed national consciousness,
the source of the nation-state's cultural stability.
Second, the nation-state's Enlightenment roots make it difficult to
settle on national aspirations. Constitutions both reflect and alleviate
this difficulty. For example, as Mark Tushnet has noted, post-
Enlightenment states generally use constitutions both to structure
their governments according to particular needs of the state and to
commit the state to universal moral principles. 139 These bifurcated
constitutive aspirations reflect the logical need for a government to
concern itself with the specific community it represents and the
pervasive influence of the Enlightenment's concern for universal
values discussed earlier in this article. 40 For example, one place in
which the U.S. Constitution expresses its commitment to universal
values is in its Preamble, wherein "We the People of the United
137. See Iris M. Young, Beyond Borders, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS 61-62 (Joshua Cohen et al.
eds., 1999) (arguing that social and economic connections between citizens of the
U.S. and the people of other countries are strong enough to form a "continuous
society" between the United States and other states). This implies that the
socioeconomic and cultural ties between the people of different nation-states are
increasingly eclipsing geopolitical divisions.
138. But see e.g. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO
THE NEW NATIONALISM 24-28 (1993) (describing the resurgence of nationalism
and the nation-state over the last decade in view of ethnic conflicts in places like
the Balkans and Chechnya). However, the general trend in global affairs still seems
to point toward the decreasing cultural importance of nation-states. Indications of
this decreasing cultural importance include the continued growth of regional
conglomerations of nation-states in the formation of supra-national states such as
the European Union and the continued importance of global multi-lateral
organizations such as the United Nations.
139. See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 1330 (using Israel as an example of a nation-
state's attempt to accommodate both universalism and particularism).
140. See Richard Warren Perry, The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the
Legal Construction of Native American Tribal Identity, 28 IND. L. REv. 547
(providing a helpful discussion regarding the relationship between the rise of the
nation-state and the Enlightenment).
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States" claim to have decreed the Constitution to uphold universal
values, such as "Justice.""'4 At the same time, the judiciary must
apply the Constitution to the particular issues affecting Americans as
citizens of a specific nation-state-the United States of America.
American constitutionalism mediates the tension between
universalism and particularism by articulating American
particularism with respect to universal yearnings in the interpretation
of the Bill of Rights.'42 Thomas Jefferson reflected this cosmopolitan
formulation of American civic parochialism when he wrote, "[l]et
this be the distinctive mark of an American, that in cases of
commotion he enlists under no man's banner, but repairs to the
standard of the law."'
143
However, the universalist-particularist tension is difficult to
manage in countries that lack the wherewithal to settle on the shared
constitutive aspirations necessary to establish common cultural
referents. This inability can hamper the formation of empowered
constitutionalism, which is critical to the maintenance of a coherent
state nomos, perhaps ultimately threatening state maintenance. For
example, Israel has struggled throughout its history with the question
of whether to see itself as a secular liberal Jewish state or a religious
state united under the Halachic code. "44 In a sense, proponents of
141. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
142. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, Constitutional Faith, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 32 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996)
(citing an appeal by Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter for Americans to be bound
together by the universal ideals expressed in the Bill of Rights); see also Tushnet,
supra note 8 (providing examples of when Supreme Court Justices have embraced
and rejected cosmopolitan readings of the Constitution).
143. BARBER, supra note 142, at 32.
144. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, Constitution-Making: The Pre-Eminently Political
Act, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 20-
21(Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1990); Zeev Segal, A Constitution Without a Constitution:
The Israeli Experience and the American Impact, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 20-21
(1992) (describing the debate regarding drafting a formal Israeli constitution and
Bill of Rights); ABRAMOV, supra note 19 (relating the development of formal
Israeli law); GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (1993); Donna E. Arzt, Religious Freedom in a
Religious State: The Case of Israel in Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 9
WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 8-19 (1990) (discussing the intersection of religious and secular
law in Israel); CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, 2 RELIGION AND
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both groups are dedicated to particularism and universalism. Secular
liberal Jews are Jewish nationalists who want to anchor their brand
of liberal universalism in the physical site of the Israeli nation-
state. 45 Religious Jewish nationalists believe that Jewish law under
the Torah should not only root itself in Israel, but should also apply
beyond the borders of Israel to Jews living throughout the
Diaspora. 1
46
However, in their most extreme forms, the two ideologies differ
regarding the degree of cosmopolitanism inherent in their respective
worldviews. Generally speaking, at their most extreme, secular
liberal Jews believe that liberal Israeli constitutive values should take
root in the geopolitical particularity of Israel as a function of
propagating democracy globally without religious, ethnic, or national
distinction. On the other hand, religious Jews are concerned with the
relevance of the Halachic code only to the lives of other Jews,
regardless of where those Jews may reside. Secular liberal Jews
emerge as relative cosmopolitans in this comparison, while religious
Jews are relatively particularist in orientation. As discussed in greater
detail in Part II, the tension between universalist and particularist
impulses' 47 has stymied Israel's efforts to develop a coherent set of
POLITICS IN ISRAEL (1984); STUART A. COHEN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA,
COMPARATIVE JEWISH POLITICS: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS (1986).
145. See Arzt, supra note 144, at 12-14 (explaining conflicts between liberal and
orthodox Jews).
146. See id. A strong example of this is the manner in which Israeli orthodox
Jewish parties have attempted to define who is truly "Jewish" so as to prevent non-
sanctioned Jews from assuming Israeli citizenship through the Right of Return
upheld by Israeli law. The Right of Return guarantees automatic Israeli citizenship
to Jews emigrating to Israel from the Diaspora. The imposition of an orthodox
Jewish definition of Jewish authenticity on Israeli law would intentionally help
shape Jewish identity beyond the borders of Israel.
147. See PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON
AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY xiii (1997) (describing the particularist-
universalist tension in Israel as a struggle between "catastrophe Zionism" and
"utopian Zionism"). Lahav defines these categories by stating that, "[flor
catastrophe Zionists, Israel serves primarily as a safe haven from repetition of the
various catastrophes that have befallen Jews in the past. In contrast, utopian
Zionism stands for the proposition that Israel should be constructed as a model
state." Id.; see also Donna E. Arzt, Growing a Constitution: Reconciling Liberty
and Community in Israel and the United States, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 257
(1994) (discussing the Holocaust as a form of particularism in Israeli
constitutionalism); Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The
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constitutive aspirations in the establishment of empowered
constitutionalism.'48 Consequently, the Israeli state's nomic self-
conception is fragmented and uncertain.
Empowered constitutionalism helps manage the nation-state's
struggle between universalist and particularist yearnings by using
shared cultural referents to unite the myriad communities composing
nation-states beneath the aegis of common constitutive aspirations
reflecting the state's nomic self-conception. This does not
necessarily mean that citizens commonly share and uphold these
constitutive aspirations. It merely requires the state nomic self-
conception to reflect what citizens collectively imagine as unifying
constitutive principles. Thus, it does not matter whether the
proverbial Framers of the U.S. Constitution spoke for the majority of
Americans when the Framers enacted the Constitution. What is
important is that the Framers successfully agreed upon constitutional
principles that were crystallized into shared cultural referents via the
Constitution, and that Americans believe in the abstract notion that
these referents define Americans as Americans. 149
The difficulty with this process lies in creating a situation in which
the state can agree on principles worthy of codification as cultural
referents. Paradoxically, it is questionable whether a nation-state may
Failure of the Israeli Legal System to Prevent the Torture of Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 75 (2001) (assessing the
impact of national security in Zionist cultural narratives); Tushnet, supra note 8, at
1330-41 (elaborating on Lahav's categories by offering the additional possibility of
a model Jewish state that combines aspects of particularist-universalist ideologies);
LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL, supra note 144, at
48-51, 54-56 (discussing the universalism of Labor Zionism versus the
particularism of Holocaust-based particularism in Israeli "civil religion"). While
this aspect of the particularist-universalist tension affects Israeli constitutionalism,
the conflict that has directly hampered the growth of Israeli constitutionalism is the
struggle over Israel's identity as a religious versus secular state.
148. See discussion infra Part II.A. I (discussing Israeli cultural ambivalence and
constitutional reluctance).
149. See TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 50-53 (noting that "[a]t the level of
national self-definition, not race, not religion, not ethnicity, but a commitment to
constitutional principles defines the people of the United States"); see also
BARBER, supra note 142, at 32 (discussing the development of American
patriotism). Echoing Tushnet's point, the late Justice Felix Frankfurter declared
that American citizenship is a type of "fellowship which binds people together by
devotion to certain feelings and ideas and ideals summarized as a requirement that
they be attached to the principles of the constitution." Id.
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survive its inherent instability without empowered constitutionalism,
and yet a nation-state must enjoy a modicum of cultural stability to
establish empowered constitutionalism in the first place. How does a
nation-state achieve or compensate for the absence of this antecedent
stability? Part II applies the insights gained in Part I to Israel's
constitutional genesis to evaluate the possibility that textualism may
help facilitate the stability necessary as a precondition to the
establishment of empowered constitutionalism.
II. WRITTEN-NESS AND ISRAELI
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Textualism is the belief that constitutional principles should grow
organically from the Constitution's text.150 Originalism is the related
view that original understandings of the Constitution's text traceable
to the document's Framers should control constitutional
interpretation.'' Both views regard written-ness as a constitutional
virtue, demanding formal adherence to the written words of the
Constitution.' These linked perspectives have historically exerted
and continue to exert a powerful influence on debates over
constitutional interpretation.5 3
David A. Strauss presents a compelling descriptive and normative
alternative to these viewpoints.'54 He argues that the Constitution's
text is secondary to the judiciary's evolving understanding of the
Constitution through precedent.'55 Contrary to the various factions of
textualists and originalists representing the prevailing norm of
150. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 881-82 (examining the use of the
Constitution's text in judicial decision making).
151. See id. at 882 (discussing the role of the Framers' intentions in
constitutional interpretation).
152. See id. at 879 (tracing the views of various constitutional scholars as to
methods of interpretation).
153. See id. at 877-79 (offering specific examples of textualist and originalist
critiques and defenses of constitutional adjudication from the liberty-of-contract,
Lockner era, and the post-Warren Court era of the U.S. Supreme Court).
154. See Strauss, supra note 6 (evaluating traditional theories of constitutional
interpretation).
155. See id. at 878 (stating the view of many that principles of constitutional law
must be traced to constitutional text).
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constitutional interpretation, Strauss maintains a pragmatic regard for
the Constitution's text while rejecting any inherent value in
upholding the Constitution's language as the inviolable bedrock of
American constitutionalism.'56
According to Strauss, the specific words and original meanings of
the Constitution play at most a minor role in the practice of
contemporary constitutional interpretation.'57  He argues that
constitutional adjudication primarily relies on settled principles of
law that are divorced from the plain language of the document.'58 In
fact, Strauss notes that some principles of constitutional
interpretation squarely contradict the Framers' original
understandings of the Constitution. For example, debates over the
Equal Protection Clause focus on the principles behind the Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'59 rather than on the words
of the Constitution.160 Strauss's main point is that the progressively
changing understanding of the legal significance of constitutional
language via adjudication and judicial adherence to the principle of
stare decisis in a process akin to the development of common law
has effectively, if not entirely, displaced slavish obsession with the
Constitution's plain language and original meaning.'16
On the other hand, Strauss's "common law constitutional"
approach does leave some room for textual influence on what Strauss
identifies as rational traditionalist and conventionalist grounds.
Briefly, rational traditionalism is the practical adherence to the
Constitution's text as a set of well-tested judgments that have
156. See id. at 879 (using a common law approach as an example of an
interpretive analytic that better restrains judges, is more justifiable, and provides a
better record of our practices than textualism or originalism).
157. See id. at 883-84 (examining the role of text in the evolution of
constitutional doctrine).
158. See id. (providing as an example of this phenomenon the separation of
church and state, an accepted principle that is not a necessary implication of the
Establishment Clause).
159. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
160. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 877, 883 (discussing the limitations of
decision-making based solely on the written word of the Constitution).
161. See id. at 928-29 (explaining that precedent allows judges to balance the
spirit of the Constitution's text with a sense of moral rectitude and evolving
democratic traditions).
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remained valid under changing conditions.162 Such judgments matter
less because of their age than for their general reliability as well-
tested legal principles of the highest order. 163 However, where a prior
judgment makes less sense than a new idea, the old judgment may be
cast aside with relative ease such that "revolutionary change remains
possible. ' ' "6
Similarly, conventionalism is the pragmatic notion that "it is more
important that some things be settled than that they be settled
right. ' 165  Conventionalism presupposes that, at best, the
Constitution's text may provide generally precise and therefore
useful guidance. Where the Constitution's text fails to provide such
guidance, adherence to the text at least narrows the range of
interpretive discussion, enhancing the efficiency of constitutional
discourse.
The interaction of the forces of rational traditionalism and
conventionalism produces a vision of the Constitution as a protocol,
as a general outline for the practical evolution of the Constitution's
own meaning. This perspective is valuable because rather than seeing
the Constitution as a universal, basically unchanging scheme
demanding absolute adherence, Strauss's view recognizes the living
value of constitutional text. The perspective thereby overcomes the
essential problem of originalism: the fundamental lack of relevance
of the judgments of people (the Framers) who lived long ago in a
society vastly different from our own. Strauss's common law
constitutionalism allows the Constitution to constantly reevaluate
itself and evolve, using the Constitution's text as a framework and
starting-point. It also avoids the inherent challenge of textualism:
what to do when constitutional text neither squares with society's
changing needs nor makes plain sense? This problem does not arise
under common law constitutional interpretation, because under
162. See id. at 892 (positing that under this view, although the Framers do not
rule us today, their judgments were based on serious deliberation).
163. See id. (arguing that un-amended parts of the Constitution have been
implicitly accepted by many generations and thus should not be haphazardly swept
aside). These portions should be changed only with proof that they are mistaken, or
that they constantly fail. Id.
164. Id. at 895.
165. Id. at 907.
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Strauss's approach, constitutional text is less meaningful than the
changing structure of the legal precedent built over that text.
Strauss's understanding of constitutional interpretation harmonizes
with the description of empowered constitutionalism as a cultural
stabilizer presented in Part 1.166 Constitutional interpretation must
evolve over time to maintain the relevance of the common cultural
referents that are pivotal to the stabilizing quality of empowered
constitutionalism.167 Strauss's notion of common law constitutional
interpretation thus makes sense as a practical, sound analytic. Indeed,
as Strauss concludes, perhaps we should be less concerned with the
written-ness of constitutions as a measure of the strength of
constitutional regimes, than with the maturity and entrenchment of
constitutional traditions in a given society.
168
Or should we? As already suggested, the presence of a stable set
of constitutional aspirations is an essential ingredient in the
development of the shared cultural referents that lie at the heart of
empowered constitutionalism.169 In light of this understanding,
Strauss's concept of common law constitutionalism begs the
question: is it possible to develop a mature constitutional tradition
without some formalist commitment to text? Could this text serve as
a source of normative authority with the legitimacy necessary to
166. See supra notes 31-149 and accompanying text (exploring the concept of
empowered constitutionalism).
167. However, where Strauss emphasizes the importance of the facilitation of
constitutional discourse, the theory of empowered constitutionalism developed in
Part I focuses upon stability and hierarchies of legal interpretation as a means of
state cultural regulation. This is most evident in the contrasting virtues of
conventionalism at work in Strauss's theory versus conventionalism's role in the
notion of empowered constitutionalism presented in this article. Strauss upholds
conventionalism primarily because it enhances constitutional dialogue by
narrowing interpretive options. However, conventionalism is important in
empowered constitutionalism because conventionalism limits the normative
possibilities of legal meaning, thereby helping to enable cultural stability-cum-state
control of society.
168. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 879-80 (expressing a preference for a method
of constitutional interpretation that focuses less on texts and more on the
entrenchment of constitutional traditions).
169. See id.; supra notes 36-60 and accompanying text (exploring the
democratic ideals embodied in the Constitution).
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bridge the gap between inchoate constitutional yearnings and stable
constitutive aspirations?
One way to evaluate these questions is by examining the
constitutional experience of another liberal democratic state. Israel
provides a particularly useful example in such an investigation by
turning Strauss's central assumption regarding constitutional
development on its head.17 Strauss's analysis takes for granted that
somebody has already written a constitution and that
constitutionalism develops by departing from this initial textual
foundation.' 7' In contrast, Israeli judges have developed Israeli
constitutionalism through adjudication on the path toward the
establishment of a textual foundation to a constitution. Thus,
examination of the Israeli experience should provide a fresh
understanding of the importance of written-ness to empowered
constitutionalism.
Part II examines these issues by reviewing the history of Israeli
constitutionalism. This contentious history reflects the struggle
between liberal secular-universalist and religious-particularist types
of Jewish nationalism in the development of an Israeli national
consciousness. Despite this instability, two watershed cases decided
by the Israeli Supreme Court have proven decisive in the
development of empowered constitutionalism in Israel: Kol Ha 'am172
and Mizrachi Bank.'73 The two cases are instructive in their use of
text as a means of establishing empowered constitutionalism.
170. There is a strong argument that Israel is an ethnic democracy whose liberal
values extend mostly to Jews. See Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship
and Membership in the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 271 (1999)
(defining ethnic democracy in Israel as a situation in which "Israel's Arab citizens
receive full civic and political rights, but have no access to the 'common good'
foundations of the Jewish state"). For the purposes of this article, an ethnic
democracy represents a sufficient expression of liberal democratic principles to
permit comparative analysis with American constitutionalism.
171. See generally Strauss, supra note 6 (examining various methods of
interpreting the U.S. Constitution).
172. Kol Ha'Am, I SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL:
1948-1953, at90.
173. Ha'Mizrachi Bank, '31 ISRAEL L. REV. at 764.
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A. ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
1. Cultural Ambivalence and Constitutional Reluctance
Israeli constitutional history is marked by a cycle of promise,
compromise, and ambivalence.' 74 This unsettled condition reflects
the cultural instability of Israeli society. This instability has hindered
the Israeli development of the common cultural referents that
undergird empowered constitutionalism. The Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel (the Declaration of
Independence) promised that an Elected Constituent Assembly
would formally adopt a constitution for Israel no later than October
1, 1948.117 However, the Israeli Constituent Assembly was not
elected until January 1949.176 The Constituent Assembly ultimately
found it impossible to establish a consensus regarding the language
of constitutional provisions.177
This reluctance to formally declare a written constitution that
would capture Israel's constitutive aspirations stemmed from a
174. See, e.g., The Honorable Dalia Domer, Does Israel Have a Constitution?,
43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1325 (1999) (providing a general history of Israeli
constitutional evolution); Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of
Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J.
COMp. L. 585 (1996) (discussing the role of courts in developing Israeli law);
Amos Shapira, Why Israel Has No Constitution, But Should, And Likely Will, Have
One, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 283 (1993); Zeev Segal, A Constitution Without A
Constitution, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1992); Daphne Barak-Erez, From an
Unwritten To A Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge In American
Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 309 (1995); Z. Sigal and A.S. Rehany,
The Promised Constitution of the Promised Land: The Israeli Constitutional
Experience, DENNING L.J. 63 (including a particularly detailed account of the
Harari Resolution); Ran Hirschl, Israel's "Constitutional Revolution ": The Legal
Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties In An Emerging Neo-Liberal
Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998) (exploring Israeli's constitutional
revolution with regard to labor rights); Bernard Susser, Toward a Constitution For
Israel, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 939 (1993); GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF
GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (1993); Arzt,
supra note 147.
175. ISRAEL'S WRITTEN CONSTITUTION: VERBATIM ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND OF THE BASIC LAWS, CONSOLIDATED
AND UPDATED AS OF MARCH 1, 1995 6-8 (1995).
176. See sources cited supra note 174.
177. See id.
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variety of factors. First, Israeli law in the period immediately
following the dissolution of the British Mandate inherited the
received tradition of British law, which did not then constitutionally
protect human rights.'78 This discouraged the Israeli perception that
their new state urgently required a constitution.'79
Furthermore, as socialists, revolutionaries, and pragmatists, the
leadership of the new state had little regard for a liberal democratic
commitment to the rule of law. 80 Many of Israel's early leaders,
particularly the leaders of Mapai, the Jewish Socialist Party that
dominated Israeli politics until 1977,181 were committed socialists.
18 2
These leaders generally viewed justice as ultimately indeterminate
and the law as a socially constructed tool useful only to advance the
state's sociopolitical agenda.'83 This ambivalence regarding the law
is reflected in the fact that the Israeli government did not treat the
judiciary as a co-equal branch of government until 1953. 184
Also, Israeli leaders, as Zionists, had for decades fought against a
status quo that had oppressed Jews globally.'85 In particular, these
leaders had recently overthrown the British Mandate.'86 The leaders
178. See Shapira, supra note 174, at 285-86 (explaining that Israeli law inherited
much from the British mandate). Under the Human Rights Act, the United
Kingdom developed constitutional legislation that protected human rights. Id; see
also Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches In
Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 101, 140-43
(2002) (explaining that British law ultimately recognized and protected human
rights under the Human Rights Act of 1998).
179. See Shapira, supra note 174, at 286 (exploring the effect of British law on
the development of Israeli law).
180. See id. (positing that a written constitution would hamper the political
efforts of the Knesset).
181. See generally TOM SEGEv, THE SEVENTH MILLION (1993) (providing an in-
depth discussion of the development of Israeli politics). In 1977, Herut, Israel's
right-wing party, rose to power under Menachem Begin. Id.
182. See LAHAV, supra note 147, at 86-88.
183. See id. at 86.
184. See id. (explaining that in 1953, the Knesset passed a bill formally granting
the judiciary independence from the rest of the state apparatus).
185. See SEGEV, supra note 181; LAHAV, supra note 147 (describing the attitude
of Zionist leaders).
186. See SEGEV, supra note 181 (stating that many Israeli leaders had actually
fought as terrorists against the British occupiers of Palestine); MENACHEM BEGIN,
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were thus disinclined to perceive order as a necessary virtue in
governance. To the contrary, as one commentator has remarked, the
Israeli national character was marked by "deep streaks of
lawlessness."' 87 The pragmatic assessment that the state would
require the maximum freedom available to defend the new country
against foreign threats reinforced national "lawlessness." '88 This
pragmatism expressed itself as a deep-seated disdain for the due
process of law and civil liberties. 8 9 David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first
Prime Minister, reflected the synergistic impact of these factors
during a debate in the Knesset regarding the passage of emergency
state powers that threatened civil liberties:
[e]very jurist knows how easy it is to weave juridical cobwebs to prove
anything and refute anything .... As a [former] law student I know that
no one can distort any text and invent farfetched assumptions and
confusing interpretations like the jurist .... We need recognition of the
reality and knowledge of the facts, and this should be decisive, not
juristic, legalisms. 1
90
However, the primary source of Israeli reluctance to establish a
constitution lay in the new state's ambivalence regarding Israeli self-
identity. This ambivalence had two aspects. One argument against
Israel's readiness for a constitution lay in Israel's ongoing
commitment to what a Zionist might call the "in-gathering of Jewish
THE REVOLT (1951) (offering the late Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin's
personal account of his role as a leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, which had fought
against the British Mandate).
187. LAHAV, supra note 147, at 86.
188. Id.; see Shapira, supra note 174, at 286 (stating that Israel's unresolved
national security problem has made many Israelis apprehensive about writing a
constitution in a situation where the very physical survival of the nation has not yet
been guaranteed and is constantly challenged).
189. See Shapira, supra note 174, at 286 (noting that writing a constitution in
this tumultuous time would mean giving the government, and especially the
military, far reaching powers, which were bound to encroach upon human rights
and fundamental freedoms); Arzt, supra note 147, at 256 (stating that David Ben-
Gurion proposed establishing an Israeli "Bill of Obligations," rather than a Bill of
Rights) Instead of stressing the importance of citizens' rights, many pragmatic
Israeli leaders favored a legal system that emphasized the duties of citizenship. See
id.
190. LAHAV, supra note 147, at 87.
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exiles" from the Diaspora.191 Many influential political leaders of the
day held that it did not make sense to prematurely commit the
nascent state to constitutive principles given that the Zionist project
of importing world Jewry from the Diaspora to Israel had scarcely
begun.' Indeed, Jewish leaders expected forthcoming torrents of
Diaspora Jews emigrating to Israel. 9 3 These leaders thought that it
was prudent to wait to establish an Israeli constitution until the bulk
of these immigrants had arrived in Israel. This would supposedly
allow the newcomers to share in the process of helping the new state
decide upon a constitution that would bind all Israeli citizens, old-
timers and newcomers alike. 94 However, this was not the best
argument for repeatedly postponing the creation of an Israeli
constitution in light of the fact that only a relatively small number of
the Jews expected to ultimately become Israeli citizens actually
emigrated to Israel. 95
A stronger reason for Israel's difficulty establishing a national
self-identity was the question of whether Israel should be a secular
state dedicated to liberal democratic values or a Jewish state that
should exist only under the religious mandate of the Halachic
Code. 196 The most obvious expression of this conflict lay in the
191. Shapira, supra note 174, at 285.
192. See id. (recounting the hypothesis that at the time of the declaration of
independence, Israeli citizenry comprised only a small portion of the potential
future residents).
193. See id. (noting that Israel expected a large immigration boom, and that in
fact hundreds of thousands of people immigrated to Israel in the late 1940s and
early 1950s).
194. See id. (stating that it would be imprudent and politically illegitimate to
write a constitution that would then be difficult to change in the future, without
giving the entire potential population a fair opportunity to participate in the
process).
195. See SEGEV, supra note 181 (explaining the disappointment of many Israeli
Zionist leaders at the fact that only a relatively small number of Diaspora Jews
eventually made aliyah-the return to Israel from exile in the Diaspora).
196. See Sapir, supra note 3, at 633-34 n.53 (describing political divisions in
Israel's early constitutional development). This is not meant to suggest that the
schism had to express itself in zero sum terms. A basically secular Israeli state that
officially recognizes and upholds certain distinctively Jewish religious ideas was
and is a constitutive possibility for Israel. However, the debate generally polarized
into two distinct and antithetical camps.
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conflicting views of religious versus secular political parties.1 97
Religious political parties objected to a constitution that relied on
"the people," rather than God, as an ultimate source of legitimacy. 198
On the other hand, secular political parties objected to a constitution
that rested upon divine sovereignty. 99 These clashing views
originated in the development and subsequent fragmentation of
Zionist thought in the nineteenth century, which pitted liberal secular
Zionists focused on cultural nationalism against religious Zionists
dedicated to a religious nationalist identity. 00
The Constituent Assembly reacted to the impasse formed by the
collision of these related yet divergent worldviews by declaring its
inability to create a constitution and the consequent passage of
197. See id. This ambivalence about identity resonates with the particularist-
universalist tension at the heart of the nation-state. See discussion, supra Part I.B.3.
198. See id. (addressing the political dissent between religious and secular
parties); see also ABRAMOV, supra note 19; COHEN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note
144 (examining the religious aspects of Israeli constitutionalism); LIEBMAN &
DON-YEHIYA, supra note 144.
199. See Sapir, supra note 3, at 633-34 (asserting the political views of the non-
religious parties).
200. See ABRAMOV, supra note 19, at 55-81 (discussing the rise of Jewish
nationalism). Historically speaking, it is possible to divide Zionism, or Jewish
nationalism, into four camps. The ideological cleavages between these groups
created cultural schisms that continue to destabilize Israeli society. Dr. Theodor
Herzl, often celebrated as the ideological founder of the Israeli state, founded
political Zionism through the World Zionist Organization. Herzl's Zionism was
secular, liberal, and supported primarily by Western European Jews. Its basic
premise was that the lack of a nation-state resulted in the oppression of Jews
throughout the Jewish Diaspora. In contrast, Ahad Ha'Am was supported primarily
by Eastern European Jewish members of the World Zionist Organization. Ahad
Ha'Am rejected religious nationalism, but believed in the necessity of promoting a
"Jewish spirit," which included an appreciation of the Jewish religion as an
expression of Jewish culture. Alternatively, Mizrahi was a worldwide organization
composed of Orthodox Jewish members of the World Zionist Organization.
Mizrahi supporters believed in the importance of the establishment of an Israeli
state under the Halachic Code. However, Mizrahi believed that cooperation was
necessary among the various Zionist factions, secular and religious, to ensure the
establishment of a Jewish state. Finally, Agudat Yisrael was composed of extreme
Orthodox Jews who believed in the establishment of a Jewish state under the
Halachic Code, but who rejected cooperation with secular Zionists and Mizrahi.
The group was created by Mizrahi supporters who had resigned in protest from the
World Zionist Organization.
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Israel's first legislative act, the Transition Law of 1949.201 Under the
Transition Law, the Constituent Assembly changed its name to the
"Knesset" and declared itself Israel's legislative body.20 2 David Ben-
Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, subsequently charged the first
Knesset with drafting Israel's constitution.203
The Knesset struggled for a year with the same issues that had
beset the Constituent Assembly's constitutional attempts.2 4 Mapam,
the Israeli left-wing party, formed an alliance with the right-wing
Herut party and the centrist General Zionist party in support of a
constitution.2 5 However, Mapai, the political party then dominating
the Knesset, was unwilling to establish a constitution because it
feared that a constitution would jeopardize the party's fragile
coalition government, which included religious parties opposed to a
constitution. 6 Finally, the Knesset accepted the fact that it could not
agree on a constitutional formulation capable of bridging the Israeli
polity's divided self-identity.2 7 The Knesset responded to the
impasse by passing the Harari Resolution in 1950.208
The Harari Resolution was Israel's defining act of constitutional
ambivalence. The Harari Resolution endorsed the establishment of a
constitution in piecemeal fashion through the regular passage of
201. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 588 (discussing the differing political
views of religious and secular parties, which prevented the groups from coming to
a consensus on the language of the constitution).
202. See id. (discussing the establishment of the Knesset).
203. See Susser, supra note 174, at 940 (outlining the obstacles to adopting an
Israeli constitution).
204. See id.; Hofnung, supra note 174, at 588 (addressing the Knesset's efforts
to bridge the gap between the contrasting views of the religious and secular
parties).
205. See Sapir, supra note 3, at 633-34 n.53 (examining the formation of Israeli
political camps).
206. See id.; Hofnung, supra note 174, at 588; Susser, supra note 174, at 940
(discussing the coalition between the Mapai and Orthodox religious parties).
207. See Susser, supra note 174, at 940 (asserting the reasoning behind the
Knesset's ultimate decision not to draft a constitution).
208. See Sapir, supra note 3, at 634 (indicating that the Harari Resolution
represented a political compromise for the Knesset); see also ISRAEL'S WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 175 (providing the text of the Harari Resolution).
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"Basic Laws. 2 °9 The Knesset intended each Basic Law to serve as an
independent, proto-constitutional law that the Knesset could
ultimately combine into a unified, written constitution at an
unspecified future date.2 " The Resolution thus allowed the Knesset
to avoid composing a formal constitution, which could jeopardize the
fragile stability of the Israeli polity, while at the same time retaining
the exclusive power to declare a constitution.11
Until 1992, the Knesset had passed nine Basic Laws that mainly
address the powers invested in the branches of government.2 2 None
of these nine Basic Laws addresses the protection of civil rights
founded on liberal democratic principles, nor are the nine truly
supra-legislative. 213 A few of these Laws are "entrenched;" the
Knesset can only modify them through an absolute voting majority
consisting of sixty-one of the one hundred twenty members of the
209. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 588 (outlining the role of the Basic Laws
in the eventual creation of an Israeli constitution).
210. See id. (examining the enactment of the Basic Laws and their intended
role).
211. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 144; COHEN & DON-YEHIYA,
supra note 144; Sapir, supra note 3, at 619-34 (discussing the constitutional
dimension of the so-called "status quo" doctrine in Israel). Some commentators
credit the status quo doctrine with enabling the Israeli political system to resolve
secular-religious conflict through relatively peaceful means. See id. at 625. The
doctrine entails a permanent state of ambivalence in the Israeli polity regarding the
question of whether the Israeli state is primarily religious or secular. See id. at 627-
29. The doctrine maintains this ambivalence by preserving a collection of formal
and informal arrangements regarding religion and state, thus allowing the Israeli
state to avoid directly confronting the question of its cultural basis. See id. at 619-
20. Among other things, these arrangements include the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to religious courts over matters of personal status and state observance
of Jewish religious holidays. See id. at 620-21.
212. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 588 n.10 citing GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
(SELECTED READINGS) 991-1056 (Yitzhak Galnoor & Menachem Hofnung eds.,
1993) 991-1056 (Hebrew) (providing a list of basic laws including Basic Law: the
Knesset, Basic Law: Lands of Israel, Basic Law: The President, Basic Law:
National Economy, Basic Law: The Army, Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of
Israel, and Basic Law: State Comptroller); see also ISRAEL'S WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 175 (listing the Basic Laws in their entirety).
213. See Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 314 (asserting that the Basic Laws
sought to define the form of government and its powers rather than to protect civil
rights); Susser, supra note 174, at 940 (indicating that the Basic Laws lack "special
legal standing" that distinguishes them from "normal legislation").
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Knesset.21 4 However, the Knesset can abrogate or modify the
majority of the Basic Laws via ordinary legislative procedure.2"5
More importantly, none of these Basic Laws confers upon the
judiciary the right to review and abrogate legislation for violating the
Basic Laws."1 6
However, in a 1992 "constitutional revolution," the Knesset
passed two new Basic Laws that greatly advanced the development
of empowered constitutionalism in Israel-Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty." 7 The two
1992 Basic Laws hold increased constitutional significance with
respect to empowered constitutionalism for two reasons.2t 8
214. See Susser, supra note 174, at 940 (discussing some provisions of the Laws
that have achieved special status).
215. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 594-97 (discussing the Knesset's power to
enact or amend legislation); ISRAEL'S WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 175
(expressing the Knesset's sovereign power to amend legislation).
216. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 594-95 (examining the limited power of
judicial review of legislation under the earlier Basic Laws).
217. See Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 327 (discussing the political
development and potential meaning of these two Basic Laws); Hofnung, supra
note 174, at 596 (examining the Knesset's repeal of The Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation on March 9, 1994, and its replacement by a Basic Law covering the
same subject matter and with the same title). The only substantive change in the
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, was the repeal, under pressure of religious
parties, of the provision stating that the Law could only be altered by an absolute
majority of the Knesset. See id. This was replaced by a balancing test. See id. at
595. The Knesset also passed the Basic Law: the Government in 1992. See id.; see
also Susser, supra note 174, at 944 (describing the Basic Law: the Government in
1992) The Basic Law: the Government holds little constitutional importance
relative to the two other Basic Laws passed in 1992 for two reasons. First, the
Basic Law: the Government was not actually enacted until 1996. Id. Therefore, it
did not assume full significance until after the enactment of the other two Basic
Laws passed in 1992. See id. Second, it did not represent anything particularly new
with respect to the evolution of Israeli empowered constitutionalism; it merely
made relatively minor structural reforms in Israeli government. See Barak-Erez,
supra note 174, at 315 (describing the Basic Law: The Government). The
structural component of Israeli democracy had already been well defined by the
seven Basic Laws passed by the Knesset before 1992. See id. However, the
protection of civil rights offered by the two other 1992 Basic Laws was not
previously addressed by the Knesset. See id.
218. See infra notes 226-240 and accompanying text (examining the




First, they represent a nascent Israeli Bill of Rights because they
are the first of the Basic Laws to explicitly protect civil rights. 219 The
two Basic Laws protect the rights of state citizens and residents with
respect to the unhindered pursuit of professional occupations,
freedom of movement, due process of law, life, property, privacy,
and human dignity.22 ° Second, the two Basic Laws have stronger
supra-legislative powers than previously enacted Basic Laws.
22 1
While neither Basic Law is entrenched against ordinary
parliamentary modification, both Laws contain special provisions
protecting them against modification.222 Section 8 of the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty prevents modification of this Basic Law
without satisfaction of a balancing test.23 The Section 8 balancing
test prevents the infringement of any right protected by the Basic
Law "except by a Law appropriate to the ethical values of the State
of Israel, which has a valid purpose, and then to an extent that does
not exceed necessity, or under an aforesaid Law by virtue of an
explicit authorization in it. '' 224 Section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation contains a similarly-worded provision designed to
prevent the untested modification of that Basic Law. 225 Thus, both of
these Basic Laws may only be modified or abrogated by another
Basic Law that satisfies a broad requirement of agreement with the
"values of the State of Israel. ' 226
219. See Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 323 (outlining the process by which
Israel constitutionalized human rights).
220. See Hirschl, supra note 174, at 430 (discussing the specific rights protected
by these two basic laws); ISRAEL'S WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at
10-12 (containing the translated text of the Basic Laws).
221. See Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 328-29 (outlining the amendments to
the Laws that prohibit the enactment of statutes that would infringe upon the rights
and freedoms protected by these Laws).
222. See Hirschl, supra note 174, at 430 (examining the limitation clauses in
both laws, which forbid "the infringement of the declared rights").
223. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 595 (discussing the Law's provision
protecting it from infringement by other legislation).
224. ISRAEL'S WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at 10.
225. See id. at 12 (expressing a limit on infringing legislation).
226. See Domer, supra note 174, at 1333 (asserting that the two Basic Laws also
codify Israel's dualist liberal-religious identity while emphasizing the preeminence
of liberal values in a distinctly Jewish state). This is best exemplified by the
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The fact that the Israeli judiciary ultimately holds responsibility
for evaluating subsequently passed Basic Laws against this highly
subjective norm imbues the two new Basic Laws with a previously
unrealized supra-legislative potential for judicial review.22 ' However,
this proto-constitutional legislation was not enough on its own to
establish empowered constitutionalism in Israel,22s because the Israeli
judiciary still lacked an explicitly declared power to review
legislation in light of the Basic Laws. 229 Establishing empowered
constitutionalism in Israel ultimately required a formal commitment
to textual authority in Israeli judicial opinions decided both before
and after the 1992 passage of the two Basic Laws.230
2. Text and Empowered Constitutionalism
The story of the establishment of empowered constitutionalism in
Israel is a mirror image of the development of empowered
constitutionalism in the United States with respect to the importance
aforementioned balancing test incorporated into the two Basic Laws. See id. The
balancing test requires that the infringement of a right protected by either of the
Basic Laws must satisfy the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state. See id. The test exists to protect universal, liberal-secular rights,
but is articulated in a manner that concedes a place to Jewish-particularist
concerns. See id. When the Basic Law: the Freedom of Occupation was amended
in 1994, it included an explicit acknowledgment of the principle of religious
equality, thus endangering future statutory preferences to Orthodox Judaism. See
id. at 1334. As Israeli Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner has noted, this respect
for "Jewish" concerns may represent a synthesis of Jewish cultural and democratic
principles, or it may mean that the Halachic Code is a default law that applies
when the Israeli Supreme Court is confronted by more than one approach to an
issue and both approaches are compatible with democratic principles. See id. From
the standpoint of the development of Israeli common cultural referents, either
alternative may represent a keystone articulation of Israeli self-identity and a
decisive step in the development of empowered constitutionalism. See id.
227. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 595-96 (asserting that the Laws granted to
the judiciary the power to narrowly review future legislation).
228. See Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 326 (indicating that the extent of the
power of judicial review is still relatively unclear in Israel); see also supra note
147 and accompanying text (observing that empowered constitutionalism has taken
root in the Israeli legal landscape).
229. See Hofnung, supra note 174, at 595-96 (expressing the limitations of
judicial review in Israel).
230. See supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of judicial precedent due to the lack of a constitution).
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of text. In the United States, the Bill of Rights introduced a fully-
fledged liberal constitutional regime, which the American judiciary
subsequently developed through caselaw. 31 In contrast, Israeli
constitutional development required the Israeli Supreme Court23 2 to
introduce a rights-based legal regime to Israel through a key case,
Kol Ha'Am, which ultimately led to constitutionally significant
legislation in Israel. 33 Also, the U.S. Supreme Court claimed the
exclusive right to review legislative action in light of the existent
Constitution.3 Conversely, in Israeli constitutional development, the
Israeli Supreme Court reviewed specific legislation in Mizrachi Bank
to retroactively proclaim a constitution with supra-legislative
status.235
The difference in constitutional development between the two
countries results from the contrast in the cultural stability of Israel
versus the United States.236 Americans, or at least the Framers of the
Constitution acting as representatives of the American people,
benefited from a reasonably stable cultural self-identity that allowed
the early expression of American constitutive aspirations in the Bill
231. The structural aspects of American democracy had been previously
established by the seven original articles codified by the Constitutional
Convention. The Bill of Rights was significant because it articulated the liberal
rights, the very social aspirations that American's democratic structure was
intended to serve.
232. See Arzt, supra note 147, at 257-58, quoting the Basic Law: The
Judicature, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1984), sec. 15(c) (discussing the structure and powers of
the Israeli Supreme Court). The Israeli Supreme Court consists of eleven justices.
See id. The Court sits in panels of three, although parties can seek further hearings
from panels composed of five justices. See id. The Court functions in three
capacities: as the Supreme Court of Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court of Criminal
Appeals, and as the High Court of Justice. See id. The High Court of Justice serves
as an administrative law court of first and last instance with broad authority,
including the right to intervene in cases not already within another court's
jurisdiction "in the interests of justice." See id.
233. See Dorner, supra note 174, at 1326-27 (announcing that Israeli Supreme
Court caselaw established certain civil rights as fundamental legal norms).
234. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (expressing the necessity of
judicial review to uphold the Constitution).
235. See Dorner, supra note 174, at 1330 (indicating that the Israeli Supreme
Court gave supra-legislative, constitutional status to the Basic Laws passed in 1992
in Mizrachi Bank).
236. See discussion, supra Part I.C.3, 1I.A.1.
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of Rights.237 Over time, as the United States has grown increasingly
heterogeneous, the general constitutive aspirations codified in the
Bill of Rights have served as stabilizing common cultural referents.
In contrast, Israel has historically proven ambivalent on a national
level regarding its self-identity, and has thereby lacked sufficient
cultural stability to encode its social aspirations in a constitution.
2 38
Nevertheless, Israel has managed to develop empowered
constitutionalism through caselaw despite lacking a constitution to
serve as a normative statement of agreement upon a basic national
self-identity.239
How was the Israeli state able to do this? Close examination
reveals that the Israeli Supreme Court used non-constitutional text as
a source of normative authority in Kol Ha 'Am and Mizrachi Bank to
help establish empowered constitutionalism in Israel. n°
a. Kol Ha'Am
In Kol Ha 'Am, the Israeli Supreme Court determined that the
Israeli government could not necessarily suppress public speech
despite the exigencies of national security threats. 24 ' The case
concerned the Israeli Minister of the Interior's decision to suspend
the publication of two newspapers for publishing controversial
stories that were critical of the Israeli government. 42 In March 1953,
Kol Ha 'Am, a newspaper published by the Israeli Communist Party,
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Dorner, supra note 174, at 1325-26 (asserting that the Declaration of
Independence provides the basic principles for the protection of human rights
although it was never granted constitutional status). It is possible to point to the
Israeli Declaration of Independence as reflecting such a consensus. See id.
However, the Declaration of Independence lacks the explicit force of law that
helps "empower," so to speak, empowered constitutionalism's regulation of social
order. See id.
240. See infra notes 241-301 and accompanying text (discussing the significance
of the Kol Ha 'Am and Mizrachi Bank decisions).
241. See Kol Ha'Am, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL: 1948-1953, at 90 (ruling that freedom of expression must be balanced
against national security).
242. See id. (holding that the right to free speech outweighed state interests
under the facts of the case).
638 [18:585
EMPOWERING CONSTITUTIONALISM
and Al Itihad, the Israeli Arabic counterpart to Kol Ha 'Am, published
stories that criticized the Israeli government for allegedly promising
to commit 200,000 Israeli soldiers in support of the United States in
the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.243
Fearing that these stories might disrupt support for the Israeli
government at home and abroad, the Israeli Minister of the Interior
invoked his expansive powers under the Press Ordinance of 1933,
emergency powers that Israel had inherited from the British
Mandatory Government of Palestine, to suspend the two newspapers'
right to publish.244 The newspaper challenged the government's
action before the Israeli Supreme Court.245
The Israeli Supreme Court unanimously held that the Minister's
suspension order was invalid.246 The Court also held that free speech
is fundamental to democratic governance, stating that "[t]he principle
of freedom of expression is closely bound up with the democratic
process. ' 247 The panel deciding the case realized that the state needed
to balance the right to the freedom of expression against state needs,
saying that:
[t]he right to freedom of expression is not an absolute and unlimited right,
but a relative right, subject to restriction and control in the light of the
object of maintaining important interests of the state and society,
which ... in certain conditions ... [take] precedence over those secured
by the principle of freedom of expression.
248
Thus, "in moments of supreme urgency-when, for example, the
state is at war or is undergoing a grave national crisis-greater
weight (according to the particular circumstances of each case) will
243. Id.
244. Id.; see LAHAV, supra note 147, at 107-10 (stating that this action was
motivated by the Israeli government's rejection of the Communist Party because of
the Communist Party's opposition to Zionism's nationalist basis and the
Communist Party's repetition of Stalin's incendiary anti-Semitic and anti-Israel
rhetoric).
245. See Kol Ha'Am, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL: 1948-1953, at 90 (announcing the issue before the Court).
246. See id.
247. Id. at 94.
248. Id. at 99.
2003] 639
AM. U. INT'LL. REV.
be given to state security." '49 However, in this particular set of
circumstances, the Justices of the Israeli Supreme Court chose to
uphold the right to public expression over the national security needs
cited by the Israeli government.25 °
The Kol Ha'Am decision was the genesis of empowered
constitutionalism in Israel. Narrowly construed, the decision merely
protected the Israeli press from arbitrary oppression by the state.
More broadly speaking, in Kol Ha'Am the Israeli Supreme Court
created a limited, but important, right of judicial review in the
service of a rights-based legal regime. In the decision, the Israeli
Supreme Court recognized that it could not overrule the Knesset by
invalidating a legally promulgated statute. However, the Israeli
Supreme Court reserved the right to construe particular state action
undertaken pursuant to presumptively valid legislation for
consistency with the fundamental notions of a liberal society.25 This
limited power of judicial review allowed the Israeli Supreme Court
to invalidate government action that violated democratic norms
announced by the Declaration of Independence. 2
What is also remarkable about Kol Ha 'Am is that the Israeli
Supreme Court defended a right, the freedom of expression, which
had not previously existed in Israeli law. Deciding a similar case of
first impression, the U.S. Supreme Court would have invoked the
First Amendment of the Constitution. However, adjudicating decades
prior to Israel's 1992 constitutional revolution, the Israeli Supreme
Court decided Kol Ha'Am without any legislative or official
constitutional justification for the protection of public speech.253
249. Id. at 100.
250. See id. at 90-94 (holding that the right to free expression outweighed the
state's national security interests).
251. See Kol Ha'Am, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL: 1948-1953, at 90-94 (explaining that state security should not
categorically supercede the principle of free expression).
252. See id. (finding that the Israeli government actions that violated democratic
norms were invalid as ultra vires).
253. See LAHAV, supra note 147, at 92 (indicating that Israel's Knesset had not




Instead, the Israeli Supreme Court inserted the protection of
individual rights into the Israeli legal regime in Kol Ha 'Am through a
formal commitment to non-constitutional text as an indirect source of
normative authority in the establishment of a liberal legal system.
25 4
The Israeli Supreme Court cited the text of the Israeli Declaration of
Independence in lieu of a Bill of Rights to justify the legal protection
of individual rights, thereby helping to embed empowered
constitutionalism in Israeli legal thought.
Prior to the Kol Ha'Am decision, Israelis considered the
Declaration of Independence as an expression of popular will that
carried political force, but not the force of law. 255 However, in Kol
Ha'Am, Justice Simon Agranat, writing on behalf of the Israeli
Supreme Court, boldly and without precedent256 declared that, "we
are bound to pay attention to the matters set forth in the [Declaration
of Independence] when we come to interpret and give meaning to the
laws of the State." '257 In particular, the Israeli Supreme Court cited
the Declaration's provisions that emphasize Israeli national self-
identity's dependence upon liberal notions of democratic self-
governance, such as "'the foundations of freedom' and the securing
of freedom of conscience. 258
Subsequent Israeli Supreme Court decisions used the Declaration
of Independence in a similar manner, leading to the judicial creation
254. See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 1343-46 (elaborating upon the role of textual
formalism in the establishment of empowered constitutionalism in Israel). Mark
Tushnet recognizes the formalism that is the central strategy in Kol Ha 'Am. But see
LAHAV, supra note 147, at 108 (interpreting the Kol Ha'Am opinion as having
"rejected legal formalism and rigid positivism and [recognizing] law as a social
system and the judicial process as an enterprise engaged in balancing political
interests").
255. LAHAV, supra note 147, at 92 (describing the Israeli view of the Israeli
Declaration of Independence as a source of legal authority prior to the Kol Ha 'Am
decision).
256. See H.C. 10/48, Zeev v. Gubernik, 1 P.D. (Isr. S. Ct.) (rejecting the use of
the Declaration of Independence as a source of legal authority).
257. See Kol Ha'Am, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL: 1948-1953, at 105 (using the Israeli Declaration of Independence as a
basis for Israeli legal norms).
258. Id.
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of additional rights.5 9 This body of judicially created rights became
widely known as Israel's "unwritten constitution. 2 60 The Knesset
ultimately inscribed many of these rights into the two
constitutionally significant Basic Laws passed in 1992.261 As Justice
Aharon Barak, speaking for the majority of the Israeli Supreme
Court in Mizrachi Bank, found:
[t]he constitutional revolution in the field of human rights is built upon
the foundation of judicial precedent. In exercising its constituent
authority, the Knesset adopted a number of judicially formulated rights
and conferred upon them a supra-statutory constitutional status...
Without the contribution of the case law, it would not have been possible
to erect the constitutional structure in the area of human rights.
262
259. See Dr. Asher Maoz, Defending Civil Liberties Without A Constitution-
The Israeli Experience, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 815, 826 (1988) (noting the constant
reference to the Declaration of Independence as a supra-statutory source of
constitutional authority in Israeli caselaw protecting civil rights left unprotected by
the Knesset); see also Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 316-17 (noting that the
Israeli Supreme Court created a right to personal liberty in Al-Karbutli v. Minister
of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1948); a right to freedom of religion, conscience, and
equality in Peretz v. Local Council of Kfar Shmaryahu, 16 P.D. 2101, 2116,
translated in 4 Selected Judgments 191 (1962); and the right to procedural due
process in Berman v. Minister of the Interior, 12 P.D. 1493, translated in 3
Selected Judgments 29 (1958)). Careful readers will note that AI-Karbutli was
decided before Kol Ha'Am and might therefore question why Kol Ha'Am has
greater relevance to the creation of Israeli constitutionalism than Al-Karbutli. Al-
Karbutli concerned a habeas corpus petition involving an Arab detained under the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 on suspicion of espionage and sabotage
during the Israeli War of Independence. The Israeli Supreme Court decided the
case on narrow technical grounds, ordering the release of the detainee because a
non-judicial advisory committee required under the Regulations to review the
detention did not exist at the time of the detention. The fact that Al-Karbutli was
decided on merely technical grounds, rather than by articulating a substantive
vision of the law producing a significant precedential impact, makes the case
relatively less influential than Kol Ha'Am with respect to the development of
Israeli empowered constitutionalism.
260. Barak-Erez, supra note 174, at 317 (explaining that Israel governed its
people without a written constitution).
261. See Ha'Mizrachi Bank, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. at 778 (finding that earlier
decisions of Israel's judicial body contributed to the establishment of Israel's
written constitution).




Before the two Basic Laws passed in 1992 could fully assume
constitutional import, the Israeli Supreme Court had to establish its
right to overturn legislation contradicting the Basic Laws.
Establishing this right first required the Israeli Supreme Court to
retroactively empower the Knesset to act as a constituent assembly
with the authority to imbue the Basic laws passed in 1992 with
supra-legislative constitutional status. The Israeli Supreme Court
recognized the Knesset's power to act as a constituent assembly in
Mizrachi Bank and thereby set the foundation for a full-fledged
power of judicial review in Israel.263
Mizrachi Bank concerned the Family Agricultural Sector Law (the
Gal Law), which was designed to help rehabilitate Israel's
agricultural industry.264 The Gal Law provided for the establishment
of a special administrative body, the "Rehabilitator," which, among
other powers, could cancel part of a debt.265 In the facts leading to the
case, creditors of a debt cancelled by the Rehabilitator asked an
Israeli District Court to annul the Gal Law for allegedly violating the
creditors' property rights.266 The District Court decided the case in
the creditors' favor, holding that the Gal Law should be annulled for
violating Section 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.26
This decision marked the first instance of an Israeli court overturning
a law, rather than merely specific government action undertaken
pursuant to a law, for being unconstitutional.268
263. See id. at 765-66 (stating that Ha'Mizrachi Bank launched judicial review
for Israel's judicial system).
264. See id. at 764 (stating that Israel created the Family Agricultural Sector
Law ("Gal Law") in response to a severe economic process).
265. See id. (explaining how the Gal Law served to rehabilitate Israel's
agricultural sector).
266. See id. (illustrating Mizrachi Bank's and other creditors' argument that the
Gal Law violated their property rights).
267. See id. (providing the District Court's holding that the Gal Law violated the
creditor's property rights and should be annulled).
268. See Ha'Mizrachi Bank, 31 ISRAEL L. REv. at 766.
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The Israeli Supreme Court subsequently heard the case on
appeal.269 The basic issue was whether the judiciary held the power
to revoke a law for substantive unconstitutionality, which hinged
upon whether the judiciary could validly consider legislatively
enacted Basic Laws as supra-statutory constitutional provisions.270 A
threshold question was whether or not the Knesset had the authority
to act as a constituent assembly by establishing a constitution that
could bind the Knesset's prospective ability to legislate.271 Sitting in
an unusually large panel of nine justices, the Israeli Supreme Court
overturned the lower court's decision in the case on other grounds-
property rights under the Gal Law.272
What is important in the case with respect to the establishment of
empowered constitutionalism in Israel are the Israeli Supreme
Court's holdings in dicta.273 The Israeli Supreme Court found in dicta
by a majority of eight out of nine justices that the Knesset held the
authority to establish a constitution for Israel.27 4 Furthermore, the
justices recognized the Basic Laws passed in 1992 as supra-
legislative, constitutional rules protecting human rights. 5 Writing
for the majority, Justice Barak stated that:
[t]he Knesset... has the authority to frame a constitution. It exercised
this power in enacting two Basic Laws covering human rights. In so
doing, the Knesset created a superior constitutional norm. In the
normative hierarchy that was created, the two Basic Laws regarding
human rights stand above regular legislation. Conflict between a
269. See id. at 764 (indicating that the Israel Supreme Court heard the case on
appeal).
270. See id. at 766 (commenting on the issues before the Court).
271. See id. at 780-83 (discussing the "key issue" as to whether the Knesset had
the authority to create a constitution).
272. See id. at 766 (indicating that all nine Supreme Court Justices took part in
the decision).
273. See id. (stating that the Knesset has the authority to establish a
constitution).
274. See Ha'Mizrachi Bank, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. at 766-68, 777-80 (holding that
the Knesset has the authority to frame a constitution).




provision of one of these two Basic Laws and a provision of a regular
statute leads to the invalidation of the contradicting statute.
276
In the decision, Justice Barak also claimed an expanded right of
judicial review allowing the Israeli judiciary to construe legislation
against the newly enacted constitutional standard represented by the
Basic Laws and to nullify legislation contradicting the new
constitutional standard.277 Justice Barak thus stated in Mizarachi
Bank that "[the Israeli Supreme Court] is competent to declare the
conflicting norm invalid. In this manner, the Court actualizes
democracy and the separation of powers. Indeed, if the constitution
itself is democratic, then judicial review is democratic. ' 278 The Israeli
Supreme Court emphasized the actualization of empowered
constitutionalism in the case by declaring the 1992 Basic Laws as the
textual foundation to Israeli constitutionalism.279
Thus, the Mizrachi Bank decision was critical to the development
of empowered constitutionalism in Israel. 280 The case upheld the
Knesset's power to establish an Israeli constitution, recognized that
the human rights articulated by the two Basic Laws passed in 1992
had supra-legislative status and represented the textual basis to an
Israeli constitution, and empowered the Israeli judiciary to construe
subsequent legislation against the constitutional standard produced
by the two Basic Laws.281 While the Israeli Supreme Court expressed
these holdings in dicta, it is sufficient to note that the Israeli Supreme
Court brought Israeli constitutionalism within closer proximity than
276. Id. 777.
277. See id. However, the decision does not specify whether any Israeli court, or
only the Israeli Supreme Court, has the power to determine the constitutionality of
legislation.
278. Id. at 785.
279. See id. at 779 (stating that the two Basic Laws of human rights are
inscribed "upon the pages of the constitution and enjoy normative superiority").
280. See Ha'Mizrachi Bank, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. at 780 (declaring that Israel's
"constitutional philosophy has undergone a change").
281. See id. at 766-68, 777-80 (indicating that Israel has authority to establish a
constitution deriving from the two Basic Laws of human rights and that the Israeli
judiciary has the power to interpret Israel's constitution and laws).
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ever before to the achievement of empowered constitutionalism
through the Mizrachi Bank decision.282
The Israeli judiciary's formal invocation of textual sources of
authority was essential to this "constitutional moment." '283 For
example, speaking for the majority, Justice Barak stated that:
[i]n order to frame a constitution, which is founded on a higher normative
level than a law, the Knesset requires an Archimedes' point, external to
constitution or statute, which confers upon it authority to adopt a
constitution. The constitution cannot create the authority by which it will
be created. A statute cannot create a constitution to which the statute is
subject. Legislation cannot create the authority by which it will be
created. A constitutional act always requires a foothold external to the
legislative body."
284
Barak found the external rule that he required to justify the
Knesset's authority to establish a constitution in the same place that
the Israeli Supreme Court had discovered the authority to create a
limited right of judicial review in Kol Ha'Am-the Israeli
Declaration of Independence. 285 The majority of the Israeli Supreme
Court agreed that the Knesset derives its power to create a
constitution for Israel via the Declaration of Independence, which
expressly provided for the establishment of a constitution. 286 The
Israeli Supreme Court also agreed in Mizrachi Bank that the
282. See id. at 785 (marking an unprecedented decision to grant the Israel
judiciary the power of judicial review).
283. See Ackerman, supra note 122 (discussing "constitutional moments"). The
process of the creation of empowered constitutionalism in Israel raises the
interesting point that constitutions do not necessarily need to arise directly from
constitutional assemblies held during "constitutional moments." The fact that the
development of Israeli constitutionalism seems to rely so strongly on the Israeli
judiciary suggests that Bruce Ackerman's stress on the importance of
constitutional moments is over-stated.
284. Ha'Mizrachi Bank, 31 ISRAELL. REV. at 780-81.
285. See id. at 782-83 (holding that Israel's Declaration of Independence reflects
Israel's democratic basis).
286. See id. at 778 (finding that the Knesset's authority to establish a
constitution derives from the Declaration of Independence); Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel, ISRAEL'S WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note




Knesset's implementation of the Harrari Resolution fulfilled the
Declaration of Independence's mandate through the piecemeal
passage of separate Basic Laws that would ultimately be
consolidated into a written constitution." 7
Justice Barak further recognized in the decision that the two Basic
Laws of 1992 merely re-stated rights that the Israeli Supreme Court
had created through its own caselaw. 288 However, he emphatically
celebrated the newfound written-ness of these rights in Mizrachi
Bank28 9 by suggesting that the rights expressed by the 1992 Basic
Laws had particular force precisely because the Knesset had
committed the Israeli state to these rights textually, in legislation:
"no longer does the individual in Israel possess only 'unwritten'
judicial rights [citation omitted]. These rights were transformed into
constitutional rights which are inscribed upon the pages of the
constitution and which enjoy normative superiority.""29 This suggests
that the Israeli Supreme Court understood both the significance of
the Israeli state's willingness to commit itself to an initial set of
constitutive aspirations and the necessity of the judiciary bridging the
gap between Israel's cultural ambivalence and latent constitutive
commitment through textual formalism.
CONCLUSION: WRITTEN-NESS AS A
SUPPLEMENT TO CULTURAL STABILITY
Constitutional written-ness matters.29" ' In fact, in certain
circumstances, written-ness may prove essential to the establishment
of empowered constitutionalism. However, this possibility only
emerges in light of a critical examination of empowered
287. See Ha'Mizrachi Bank, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. at 777 (ruling that the Knesset
"has authority to frame a constitution").
288. See id. at 778 (indicating that establishing the constitutional structure of
human rights would have been impossible without the court's decisions in previous
case law).
289. See id. at 779 (suggesting that the Israel community no longer "possess
only unwritten" judicial rights, but instead can enjoy the liberty of a written
constitution).
290. Id.
291. See discussion supra Part II (arguing that constitutional text matters
because it serves as a source of legitimacy for judicial interpretation).
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constitutionalism's fundamental operation in society. Mainstream
assumptions regarding the presumed connections between
empowered constitutionalism and democratic governance tend to
obscure how judicial review conducted under the auspices of
constitutional precepts facilitates the state's control of society
through the imposition of hierarchies of legal meaning.29 2
To briefly recap the key points made above, empowered
constitutionalism is primarily involved with maintaining the state's
control of society by regulating the normative meaning of the law.293
Empowered constitutionalism controls the development of legal
meaning through jurispathy. 94 Empowered constitutionalism's
propagation of common cultural referents enables state jurispathy by
bounding the potential meaning of the law throughout society. 295
Thus, by focusing constitutional concerns, common cultural referents
do not create constitutional meaning, as we might ordinarily expect,
but instead limit constitutional meaning by anchoring constitutional
interpretation to widely shared socio-legal foci.
More importantly, common cultural referents help maintain the
state's nomic identity, an urgent constitutional function because of
the inherent instability of the national-state and post-modern
challenges to the nation-state's sovereignty. 296  Empowered
constitutionalism thus helps allow the socially atomized citizens of
nation-states to imagine themselves as aggregated communities
united beneath the banner of common constitutive aspirations. 297
A nation-state creates common cultural referents when it encodes
its social aspirations in a constitutional project. This does not require
a written commitment to these constitutive aspirations. This
codification merely necessitates a national self-identity that is
sufficiently coherent to allow the people of the society, or the state
acting as the people's representative, to commit the nation-state to
particular constitutive aspirations. As societies change, grow, and
292. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (suggesting that the role of a
constitution is to provide legal meaning as a function of facilitating state control).
293. See discussion supra Part I.C.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See discussion supra Part I.C. 1.
297. See discussion supra Part 1.C.2.
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culturally splinter, these constitutive aspirations, which perhaps once
held particular meaning, become common cultural referents.298
Where this stabilizing process cannot occur because the initial
cultural stability required to encode constitutive aspirations is
lacking, the nation-state's existence is in jeopardy if other factors do
not force the state to cohere on the level of national culture.
299
As illustrated by this article, Israel offers one way in which a
nation-state can establish empowered constitutionalism despite
lacking a coherent national self-identity. Even before the
establishment of a Jewish state, Zionism suffered from ambivalence
regarding Jewish national identity. This ambivalence centered on the
question of whether a Jewish state should organize itself primarily
around secular liberal or religious principles. 300 Following the
establishment of Israel, these issues, among others, prevented Israel
from committing itself to a national identity through a constitution.
Nonetheless, the Israeli judiciary successfully established
empowered constitutionalism in Israel in key judicial opinions
through the use of non-constitutional text as a source of indirect
298. This assumes that as nation-states develop, their cultural makeup grows
increasingly complex, a safe assumption given the post-modem challenges to the
nation-state's social and geopolitical borders.
299. See Sapir, supra note 3, at 628-29 (noting that as threats to Israeli national
security have decreased in urgency, the Israeli public has grown increasingly aware
that "unresolved internal disagreements-especially the dispute over the proper
relationship between religion and state-pose the real threat to the country's
stability"); Ervin Staub, Torture: Psychological and Cultural Origins, in THE
POLITICS OF PAIN: TORTURERS AND THEIR MASTERS 99-111 (Ronald D. Crelinsten
ed., 1995) (suggesting that a self-other dichotomy is instrumental in the formation
of national identity). For example, serious external threats, such as the presence of
hostile neighboring countries, may force a nation-state to unify to survive. Thus, it
is possible that Israel has managed to maintain a relatively stable national identity
because of the existential threat represented by Israel's Arab neighbors and
Palestinian residents, despite the considerable social disorder within Israel. An
obverse point is that some of the Arab nations that oppose Israel, such as Syria,
maintain their opposition to Israel as a means of encouraging internal support in
the face of otherwise unpopular and oppressive government regimes.
300. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (providing a discussion on the
general history of Israel and its constitution).
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normative authority in a case-by-case process of constitutional
construction.3 0'
This emphasizes two points. First, it highlights the importance of
judicial interpretation in the establishment of legal regimes. Second,
it underscores the critical importance of formal adherence to text, at
least in some circumstances, in the creation of empowered
constitutionalism. Where a society is ambivalent regarding self-
identity, text may temporarily bridge the gap between cultural
confusion and the codification of constitutive aspirations on the road
towards the development of common cultural referents. Liberal
constitutional regimes need not and generally do not slavishly adhere
to the tyranny of the written word.30 But this is not necessarily true,
at least based on the Israeli example, until after that regime has used
written-ness as the basis for establishing empowered
constitutionalism. The Israeli example indicates that language
committed to text and judicial interpretation formally tied to the
resultant codification of that language may provide sufficient
stability to establish empowered constitutionalism where societies
cannot agree upon common cultural referents.30 3 Once empowered
constitutionalism is well-established, text matters relatively little
with respect to constitutional meaning.3 4
301. See supra notes 27, 259 and accompanying text (detailing the cases that led
Israel's Supreme Court to determine that the Knesset has authority to establish a
written constitution).
302. See Strauss, supra note 6 (arguing that the text of the constitution plays a
minimal role in judicial interpretation).
303. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b (discussing how the Israeli Supreme
Court in Ha'Mizrachi Bank gave the Knesset authority to create a written
constitution).
304. See supra notes 291-299 and accompanying text (explaining why the text
of a constitution has little control over judicial interpretation).
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